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ABSTRACT 
Big cities have frequently enacted public health regulations—
especially with respect to tobacco use and obesity—that go beyond the 
state and federal regulatory floors. That cities innovate in public health at 
all is remarkable. They have less to gain financially from more stringent 
regulation than higher levels of government, which shoulder more of the 
burden of Medicare and Medicaid. Cities are supposed to fear mobile 
capital flight; if they regulate, businesses will leave. Moreover, because 
innovation is costly and likely to be copied by others when successful, a 
free-rider problem might inhibit local policy innovation generally.  
Cities’ prolific regulation in the public health sphere in spite of 
countervailing predictions thus demands an explanation. This Article aims 
to offer one, focusing on what makes local lawmaking unique from 
lawmaking at the federal and state levels. This Article argues that cities’ 
smaller scale, concentrated political preferences, and streamlined 
lawmaking processes facilitate public health innovation. With respect to 
structure in particular, cities’ unicameral legislatures and lack of a 
supermajority requirement allow affirmative regulatory legislation to 
proceed more expeditiously. Cities thus stand in contrast to the currently 
dysfunctional federal government, in which vested interest groups can 
more easily block regulatory legislation they dislike. In highlighting what 
is different about the local lawmaking process, this Article aims to better 
inform the debate about the extent of local power, which plays out in 
doctrinal areas like home rule and preemption.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Obesity and tobacco use are two of the biggest public health problems 
in the United States, each causing 400,000 premature deaths annually and 
adding billions of dollars to healthcare and other economic costs.
1
 As 
such, there is a compelling case for government regulation in these areas. 
While such regulation may be in the “public interest,” however elusively 
defined, conventional public choice theory predicts that the American 
political system is likely to under-regulate given the political influence of 
“Big Tobacco”2 and “The Food Industry.”3 These two interest groups and 
their allies frequently succeed at blocking regulations that would hurt their 
profits.
4
 Despite the public choice narrative, and irrespective of whatever 
the “right” level of regulation is from the perspective of public health or 
economics, one trend is clear: many big cities fight tobacco use and 
obesity by adopting regulations that are more stringent than those 
emanating from the state and national political systems. This Article 
attempts to explain why.  
Understanding why cities regulate public health more stringently can 
help inform a larger debate in local government law scholarship about why 
cities innovate with respect to public policy. Many scholars praise local 
lawmaking for its “innovative” power in areas like civil rights, 
 
 
 1. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, TOBACCO USE: TARGETING THE 
NATION’S LEADING KILLER, AT A GLANCE (2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/chronicdisease/ 
resources/publications/aag/osh.htm (“Each year, an estimated 443,000 people die prematurely from 
smoking or exposure to second-hand smoke . . . .”); Jieyun Yin & Jiande D Z Chen, Are We Fighting a 
Losing Battle Against Obesity?, 2 INTERN. MED., Issue 4, at 1 (2012) (“[O]besity and its co-morbidity 
lead to over 400,000 deaths and cost more than $150 billion per year . . . .”). 
 2. “Big Tobacco” is a common moniker for the top producers of tobacco products in the United 
States. See John J. Zefutie, Jr., Comment, From Butts to Big Macs—Can the Big Tobacco Litigation 
and Nation-Wide Settlement with States’ Attorneys General Serve as a Model for Attacking the Fast 
Food Industry?, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 1383, 1383 n.1 (2004) (defining “Big Tobacco” to include 
American Brands, Inc.; R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company; Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation; 
Batus, Inc.; Philip Morris Companies, Inc.; Lorillard Tobacco Company, Inc.; Loews Corporation; 
United States Tobacco Company; and Liggett Group, Inc.). Philip Morris is now called Altria Group, 
Inc. See also Karen C. Sokol, Smoking Abroad and Smokeless at Home: Holding the Tobacco Industry 
Accountable in a New Era, 13 N.Y.U.J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 81, 88–89 n.20 (2010). 
 3. The Food Industry is admittedly a motley crew, including agribusiness, fast food companies, 
soda producers, and others who stand to lose from heightened government regulation to prevent 
obesity. On any one issue, only some subset of this coalition’s members may oppose regulation 
intensely. 
 4. For this reason, this Article is not particularly interested in “symbolic” local enactments. See, 
e.g., Lori Riverstone-Newell, Bottom-Up Activism: A Local Strategy for Higher Policy Change, 42 
PUBLIUS 401 (2012) (focusing on symbolic acts of dissent by local governments, or those that merely 
apply to local governments’ internal operations, which are less likely to be opposed by industry 
groups).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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environmental protection, and campaign finance regulation.
5
 This line of 
scholarship generally supports the use of local authority to further 
“progressive” goals, and protests state and federal interference therewith.6 
The legal-academic commentary supporting local innovation, however, 
appears “result-based” insofar as it merely defends the outcomes of that 
process. This Article focuses on what is different about the local 
government process as a first step in providing a normative defense of 
local policy outcomes. 
Because this Article is most concerned with identifying why local 
governments are more eager to regulate than higher levels of government, 
it focuses on tobacco use and obesity because these problems are 
undoubtedly of national and statewide import. By addressing such issues 
at all, cities defy an increasingly discredited scholarly account that posits 
that cities legislate only with respect to the distribution of public goods 
like parks and schools, and ignore more ideological issues that higher 
levels of government are better able to address.
7
 The local action identified 
in this Article challenges the notion that there is any inherent difference 
between “local” subjects best addressed by cities and “nonlocal” subjects 
best addressed by higher levels of government.
8
 While there are some 
subjects and modes of regulation that more traditionally fall within a city’s 
ambit—like, say, parking and zoning9—tobacco use and obesity are 
undeniably problems that could be, and sometimes are, addressed by state 
 
 
 5. E.g., Matthew J. Parlow, Progressive Policy-Making on the Local Level: Rethinking 
Traditional Notions of Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 371, 375–82 (2008); Paul 
Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1114–17 (2007); Richard Briffault, Home Rule 
for the Twenty-first Century, 36 URB. LAW. 253, 259–60 (2004). 
 6. E.g., Parlow, supra note 5, at 372. By “progressive,” I intend the modern usage of this term 
in political parlance, which is more a replacement for “liberal”—that term having fallen out of favor in 
the 1990s—than a meaning rooted in the Progressive Era. See Brad Snyder, The House That Built 
Holmes, 30 LAW & HIST. REV. 661, 673–74 n.63 (2012) (noting the distinction between “liberal” and 
“progressive” during the Progressive Era). 
 7. See infra Part II.C. 
 8. Two exceptions might be national defense and Indian affairs, both of which are committed 
exclusively to the federal government by the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Immigration and 
foreign affairs are also largely reserved to the federal government by the Constitution, but state and 
local governments have contested exclusive federal control in these areas. E.g., Arizona v. United 
States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (upholding parts of Arizona’s 2010 immigration law); Crosby v. Nat’l 
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (invalidating Massachusetts law that restricted state 
agency trade with Burma).  
 9. Even with respect to these modes and subjects, however, higher levels of government 
sometimes attempt to trump local authority. E.g., Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2012) (preempting some zoning law 
s that burden religion). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss5/7
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or federal government.
10
 In other words, there is no obvious or natural 
reason why cities should seek to reduce obesity and tobacco use more than 
the state or federal governments. 
National and state officials have frequently copied local action in the 
realm of public health after cities have regulated first. Some scholars have 
discussed this process of vertical policy migration in more detail, arguing 
that policy preferences of officials (and their constituents) at higher levels 
of government are not stable, and can be reshaped by the actions of lower 
levels of government.
11
 This Article does not revisit the phenomenon of 
vertical policy migration in depth, but rather focuses on the crucial first 
step: cities enacting new public health policies that exceed the pre-existing 
regulatory floor. 
To make this project more manageable, this Article generally focuses 
on policies enacted by the twenty-five most populous cities,
12
 while 
considering less systematically the work of counties and less populous 
cities.
13
 The focus on big cities follows an intuition that they are often, but 
not always, enacting the most innovative public health regulations. Even if 
this intuition is incorrect, homing in on large cities can still tell us much 
about what is different about local government generally, since some of 
the key characteristics of structure—and, to some degree, scale—common 
to big cities are shared by almost all cities and counties.  
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I lays out the factual premise, 
demonstrating that big cities have regulated beyond the state and national 
 
 
 10. Congress’s power to “regulate commerce,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, is vast, and undoubtedly 
gives Congress broad authority to address smoking and many of the risk factors for obesity. E.g., 
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (upholding Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause to 
ban small amounts of home-grown marijuana). 
 11. E.g., Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4 
(2010); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National 
Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2007); Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden, Bottom-Up 
Federalism: The Diffusion of Antismoking Policies from U.S. Cities to States, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 825 
(2006); see also Paul A. Diller, Obesity Prevention Policies at the Local Level: Tobacco’s Lessons, 65 
ME. L. REV. 459 (2013). 
 12. Since the twenty-five most populous cities have changed over time, I focus on the most 
populous from the census (1990, 2000, or 2010) closest to the specific policy’s emergence. In doing 
so, I count as “cities” a handful of merged city-county governments (Indianapolis, Jacksonville, and 
Nashville). For the most part, the cities in the top twenty-five have remained constant; only three from 
1990 fell out of the 2010 top twenty-five: Milwaukee, Cleveland, and New Orleans (replaced by 
Charlotte, Austin, and Ft. Worth; Denver made the top twenty-five in 2000 but not in other years). See 
App. 3. 
 13. I focus on cities rather than counties in part because cities as a class have a stronger tradition 
of regulatory policy innovation. In some states, however, counties exercise significant regulatory 
authority and have been at the vanguard of public health innovation. See infra Part V. In addition to 
the three, merged city-counties noted above, Philadelphia and San Francisco are both county and city 
(with one government for both), and New York City’s government comprises five counties.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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floors to combat tobacco use and obesity. It highlights a handful of major 
regulations in each context, surveys each regulation’s genesis, and notes 
major ensuing policy migration. Part II then explains why cities’ 
innovative public health regulation is remarkable. It examines prior 
scholarly accounts that predict city inaction and analyzes why these 
narratives are wrong in the public health context. Part III then grapples 
with some prominent scholarly accounts, like communitarianism, that 
might predict innovation. I argue that these accounts are incomplete, but 
still helpful to some degree. In particular, the smaller scale of local 
government and concentrated political preferences may facilitate local 
innovation, although not necessarily in the ways other scholars have 
identified.  
Part IV then offers an additional, heretofore undervalued structural 
explanation for local innovation, arguing that big cities are uniquely 
capable of innovating in the realm of public health because their method of 
lawmaking is significantly more streamlined than that of higher levels of 
government. This streamlined system, combined with the low salience and 
smaller scale of local elections discussed in Part III, allows relatively 
poorly funded interest groups to promote legislation more effectively than 
they do at the state and national levels. Part IV focuses only on local 
governments’ political actors, assuming that any administrative action 
reflects elected officials’ will. Finally, Part V takes a closer look at public 
health innovation across the most populous cities in an attempt to discern 
which aspects of local structure affect a city’s proclivity to innovate.  
I. THE FACTUAL PREMISE: HEIGHTENED LOCAL REGULATION TO 
COMBAT TOBACCO USE AND OBESITY 
This Part establishes the factual premise that cities have enacted 
heightened, innovative regulations with respect to public health, focusing 
in depth on a handful of regulations in the tobacco and obesity contexts. 
The surveyed regulations are notable for exceeding the then-existent 
federal and state regulatory floors. In doing so, each regulation was likely 
to arouse significant opposition from the regulated industries. In 
preparation for the horizontal comparisons to be made in Part V, this Part 
notes the degree to which highlighted policies diffused to other cities 
ranking in the top twenty-five in population around the time of the 
regulation’s emergence. Because court challenges and attempts to preempt 
at higher levels can greatly affect a regulation’s potential for diffusion, this 
Part discusses such developments where relevant.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss5/7
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A. Local Tobacco Regulation 
Cities’ heightened regulation of tobacco use has coincided with 
increased public awareness of the risks of tobacco use and second-hand 
smoke exposure, as well as the revelation that most tobacco companies 
were privately aware of smoking’s harms for years but consistently denied 
them in public.
14
 While the federal and state regulatory regimes 
undoubtedly tightened from the 1970s through the 1990s, local 
governments have regulated tobacco use and availability more stringently 
in significant ways. This Section will focus on two local policies that 
substantially altered the national regulatory framework: restrictions on 
outdoor advertising by tobacco companies, and comprehensive indoor 
second-hand smoke laws. It will then also discuss other notable local 
regulations that apply to the sale, marketing, and flavoring of tobacco 
products.  
The examples discussed herein are by no means exhaustive of local 
tobacco regulation. They are, however, prime illustrations of cities moving 
before states and the federal government in areas in which cities are free to 
regulate under their home-rule powers. The analysis excludes regulatory 
measures like taxes that many cities lack the legal authority to impose.
15
 
Moreover, because this Article is primarily concerned with cities’ ability 
to enact regulatory policies that Big Tobacco would oppose, the analysis 
excludes measures that the major tobacco companies are legally estopped 
from thwarting. Pursuant to the Master Settlement Agreement (“MSA”) of 
1998, Big Tobacco may not lobby against or actively oppose regulations at 
any level of government that are specifically designed to restrict youth 
access to tobacco products.
16
 Hence, while local governments have been at 
the vanguard of restricting cigarette vending machines in order to prevent 
 
 
 14. E.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY DOCUMENTS: WHAT THEY ARE, 
WHAT THEY TELL US, AND HOW TO SEARCH THEM, A PRACTICAL MANUAL 10–11 (2d ed. 2004) 
(“[I]ndustry scientists knew or strongly suspected as early as the 1950s that tobacco smoke caused 
disease [but] the industry tried to destroy the evidence of these findings . . . .”). 
 15. Ann Boonn, Local Government Cigarette Tax Rates & Fees, CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE 
KIDS 1 (2013), available at http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0304.pdf (noting 
that “[m]ost counties and cities do not have their own cigarette tax rates because they are prohibited by 
state law, but there are major exceptions,” including New York City and Chicago). 
 16. See MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 29 (1998), available at http://www.naag.org/ 
backpages/naag/tobacco/msa (precluding settling tobacco companies from opposing “state or local 
legislative proposals or administrative rules . . . intended by their terms to reduce Youth access to, and 
the incidence of Youth consumption of, Tobacco”) [hereinafter “MSA”]; id. at F-1 (specifically listing 
“[l]imitations on Youth access to vending machines” as the kind of regulation the companies may not 
oppose). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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youth smoking,
17
 they have done so, at least since 1998, without having to 
overcome the organized opposition of Big Tobacco.  
1. Outdoor Advertising Restrictions 
The federal government largely banned cigarette advertising from radio 
and television in 1970,
18
 but said nothing about tobacco advertising in 
print media or on billboards.
19
 Cigarette advertising thus continued largely 
unabated in such media, despite increased awareness of smoking’s harms 
and the tobacco companies’ intentional targeting of minors through 
aggressive marketing.
20
 Responding to concern from public health 
organizations and community activists, Baltimore became the first 
government, at any level, to ban outdoor cigarette advertisements from 
broad swaths of its geographical jurisdiction in 1994.
21
 Although billboard 
companies sued based on the First Amendment and federal preemption,
22
 a 
large number of cities emulated Baltimore in short order. By 1998, nine of 
the twenty-five most populous cities—as well as numerous others—had 
enacted ordinances banning tobacco-related outdoor advertisements in 
much of the city, often by prohibiting them within a certain distance of 
schools, parks, playgrounds, or day-care centers.
23
  
 
 
 17. See, e.g., Allied Vending, Inc. v. City of Bowie, 631 A.2d 77 (Md. 1993) (considering 
implied preemption challenge to two cities’ local tobacco vending machine restrictions). 
 18. See Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 79 Stat. 282 (1970) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–40 (2012)). 
 19. Although the large cigarette companies have voluntarily ceased advertising in print media, 
see Stuart Elliott, Once a Mainstay of Magazines, Cigarette Makers Drop Print Ads, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
29, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/29/business/media/29adco.html?pagewanted=all, and 
some media refuse to accept their ads, see Lyle Denniston, Should Cigarette Ads Be Banned?, AM. 
JOURNALISM REV. (Nov. 1994), http://ajrarchive.org/article.asp?id=3623 (last visited Jan. 29, 2014), 
some tobacco advertising in print media persists. See Samantha Felix, Tobacco Ad Spending Is 
Plunging, Except in One Place, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 27, 2012, 11:57 AM), http://www.business 
insider.com/guess-which-magazine-has-the-most-tobacco-ads-2012-9. 
 20. See, e.g., Paul M. Fischer et al., Brand Logo Recognition by Children Aged 3 to 6 Years: 
Mickey Mouse and Old Joe the Camel, 266 JAMA 3145, 3145 (1991) (finding that ninety-one percent 
of six-year-olds recognized Joe Camel). 
 21. See App. 1 (citing Baltimore ordinance); see also Eric Siegel & Joanna Daemmrich, Council 
Favors Restrictions on Tobacco Billboards, BALT. SUN (Feb. 1, 1994), http://articles.baltimoresun. 
com/1994-02-01/news/1994032090_1_billboards-tobacco-bill-ban (reporting on the Baltimore city 
council’s preliminary approval of a bill that would “ban tobacco ads on billboards almost everywhere” 
in the city). 
 22. See Siegel & Daemmrich, supra note 21 (noting that a billboard company threatened to sue 
as soon as the council passed the bill); Penn Adver. of Balt., Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 63 
F.3d 1318, 1320–21 (4th Cir. 1995).  
 23. See App. 1; see also Daniel E. Troy, Tobacco and Alcohol Billboards Hit Hard as Dozens of 
Cities Seek Restriction, TMI—THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE MEDIA (1999), http://www.media 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss5/7
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In 1997, in a paradigmatic instance of vertical policy migration, 
California enacted statewide prohibitions on outdoor cigarette 
advertising.
24
 In 1998, forty-six state attorneys general settled their 
massive lawsuit against Big Tobacco that sought reimbursement for 
Medicaid and other expenses on the basis of consumer protection and 
antitrust laws.
25
 In the MSA, the tobacco companies agreed to restrict their 
outdoor advertising, thus substantially mooting the impetus for localities 
to continue enacting tobacco billboard bans.
26
 After the MSA, the 
Massachusetts Attorney General promulgated statewide regulations that, 
like many of the earlier local ordinances, included outdoor advertising 
prohibitions that swept more broadly than the settlement’s terms.27 In 
2001, the United States Supreme Court ruled that federal law preempted 
the Massachusetts billboard regulations insofar as they applied to cigarette 
advertising,
28
 a ruling that, by implication, largely preempted similar local 
ordinances.
29
 The Court also held that the regulations, as applied to cigars 
and smokeless tobacco, violated the First Amendment.
30
 Despite this 
negative ruling, in light of the MSA, tobacco-related billboards have 
remained essentially non-existent nationwide. Moreover, the ordinances 
 
 
institute.org/ONLINE/FAM99/Comspeech_B.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2014) (citing similar ordinances 
in nineteen other cities and one county).  
 24. See 1997 Cal. Stat. ch. 219 (A.B. 752), § 3 (codified at CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22961 
(West 2012)). 
 25. Press Release, Wash. State Office of the Att’y Gen., Attorneys General announce Tobacco 
Settlement Proposal (Nov. 16, 1998), http://www.atg.wa.gov/pressrelease.aspx?id=4568. The MSA 
followed Big Tobacco’s settlements with Mississippi, Florida, Texas, and Minnesota the preceding 
year. See Gregory W. Traylor, Note, Big Tobacco, Medicaid-Covered Smokers, and the Substance of 
the Master Settlement Agreement, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1081, 1092–98 (2010) (tracing states’ litigation 
history against Big Tobacco in the 1990s). 
 26. See MSA, supra note 16, at 22–24. In theory, tobacco companies, not a party to the MSA, 
might still advertise on billboards. Moreover, the MSA does not directly apply to cigars. An outdoor 
advertising ban, therefore, if constitutionally valid, would apply to non-participant tobacco companies 
and cigars. However, in practice, numerous other tobacco companies have joined the MSA since the 
largest manufacturers entered it in 1998, thereby enlarging the scope of the MSA’s advertising ban. 
See Participating Manufacturers Under the MSA as of June 28, 2013, http://www.naag.org/ 
backpages/naag/tobacco/msa/participating_manu/2013-06-28%20PM%20List. pdf/ (last visited Jan. 
31, 2014) (listing manufacturers participating in MSA and date of participation). 
 27. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 534–35 (2001) (citing the Massachusetts 
regulations, and noting that they “reach[] advertising . . . and members of the tobacco industry not 
covered by the [MSA]”). 
 28. Id. at 550–51. 
 29. Because local governments are sub-units of states, federal preemption of state law or 
regulation applies perforce to local law. But see Michael Clisham, Commercial Speech, Federal 
Preemption, and Tobacco Signage: Obstacles to Eliminating Outdoor Tobacco Advertising, 36 URB. 
LAW. 713, 739 (2004) (arguing that Lorillard could be distinguished if a local ordinance were aimed at 
discouraging youth access to tobacco, rather than at smoking and health generally). 
 30. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 566. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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may have contributed to the decision of some private billboard companies, 
even before the MSA, to turn away tobacco advertisements although under 
no legal obligation to do so.
31
  
Also lurking in the regulatory background was the federal Food and 
Drug Administration’s (“FDA”) attempt, in 1996, to regulate the sale and 
marketing of tobacco products by administrative rule, which included a 
provision banning outdoor advertising that resembled many of the local 
ordinances.
32
 Big Tobacco immediately challenged the FDA’s authority to 
issue the rules, arguing that they went beyond the scope of Congress’s 
delegation.
33
 The litigation halted implementation of the rules and, in 
2000, the Supreme Court sided with the tobacco companies and 
invalidated the FDA’s regulations in their entirety in FDA v. Brown & 
Williamson.
34
 In 2009, Congress finally responded to Brown & Williamson 
by granting the FDA the authority to regulate tobacco through the Family 
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (“TCA”).35 In doing so, 
Congress required the FDA to re-issue its outdoor advertising rules from 
1996, subject to any “appropriate” “modifications” due to intervening First 
Amendment precedent.
36
 Citing First Amendment concerns, however, the 
FDA has not yet issued a rule on outdoor advertising but is considering 
more narrowly tailored options that may better survive judicial scrutiny.
37
  
In one sense, the fact that the FDA attempted to ban outdoor tobacco 
advertising (and regulate tobacco in other meaningful ways) as far back as 
1996 demonstrates that there was significant federal interest in regulating 
tobacco more stringently around the time that many local outdoor 
advertising ordinances emerged. On the other hand, this federal action 
emanated from the executive branch alone in the face of a hostile 
 
 
 31. See, e.g., Glenn Collins, Major Advertising Company to Bar Billboard Ads for Tobacco, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 3, 1996, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1996/05/03/us/major-advertising-company-
to-bar-billboard-ads-for-tobacco.html. 
 32. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44617–18 (Aug. 28, 1996). See also STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND 
PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 180–95 (2008) 
(discussing the FDA’s proposed tobacco rules). 
 33. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 129–31 (2000) (tracing litigation 
history). 
 34. Id. at 161. 
 35. Family Smoking Prevention & Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 
(2009) (codified in various sections of Titles 5, 15, & 21 U.S.C.) [hereinafter, “TCA”]. 
 36. Id. § 102(a)(2)(E) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 387a-1 (2012)). 
 37. C. STEPHEN REDHEAD & TODD GARVEY, FDA FINAL RULE RESTRICTING THE SALE AND 
DISTRIBUTION OF CIGARETTES AND SMOKELESS TOBACCO, CONG. RES. SERV. 8 (2010), available at 
http://www.nacsonline.com/Issues/Tobacco/Documents/CRSReport.pdf. 
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Congress.
38
 It took nine years for Congress to respond to Brown & 
Williamson (thirteen years after the FDA’s original action) by authorizing 
the FDA to regulate tobacco, thus exemplifying how slowly the federal 
legislative process can move in the public health arena. 
2. Reducing Second-Hand Smoke 
Beginning in the 1970s, after the Surgeon General revealed that 
second-hand smoke could harm non-smokers,
39
 many states and cities 
enacted a first round of restrictions on second-hand smoke.
40
 Some of 
these laws banned smoking entirely in indoor public spaces like theaters, 
museums, buses, and government buildings, but often did not apply at all, 
or required only segregated smoking sections, in restaurants and bars.
41
 In 
1990, San Luis Obispo, California, became the first jurisdiction in the 
United States to enact a comprehensive smoking ban in indoor public 
places, prohibiting smoking entirely in restaurants and bars.
42
 Despite 
being seen as radical at the time by some residents and commentators,
43
 
this second generation of comprehensive, smokefree workplace laws 
diffused around the nation, usually at the local level, over the next two 
decades.
44
 Many cities in states with no or weak indoor smoking 
regulations, including thirteen of the top twenty-five cities, enacted such 
regulations.
45
 In some instances, these ordinances were challenged as ultra 
 
 
 38. See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 146 (tracing the history of the FDA’s interpretation of 
its authority under the organic Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act); CROLEY, supra note 32, at 187–89 
(noting Congressional opposition to the FDA’s 1996 tobacco regulations). 
 39. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: A 
REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 125–27 (1972). 
 40. See Patrick Kabat, Note, “Till Naught But Ash Is Left to See”: Statewide Smoking Bans, 
Ballot Initiatives, and the Public Sphere, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 128, 133–34 (2009); 
Shipan & Volden, supra note 11, at 829 (reviewing widespread local adoption of restrictions on 
smoking in restaurants and government buildings).  
 41. Kabat, supra note 40, at 132–34 (discussing early “environmental tobacco smoke” laws). 
 42. See Miles Corwin, Smokers Snuffed: San Luis Obispo Will Implement Nation’s Toughest 
Tobacco Law Today, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1990, available at http://articles.latimes.com/print/1990-08-
02/news/mn-1350_1_san-1u1s-obispo-support. 
 43. Id. (quoting San Luis Obispo resident referring to the city council as “communists” for 
passing the ban). 
 44. BD. ON POPULATION HEALTH & PUB. HEALTH PRACTICE, INST. OF MED., ENDING THE 
TOBACCO PROBLEM: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE NATION 191 (Richard J. Bonnie et al. eds., 2007) (noting 
that as of 2006, hundreds of municipalities had completely banned smoking in bars and restaurants). In 
a handful of states, like California (1998) and Delaware (2002), the state legislature adopted 
comprehensive bans relatively early. See Kabat, supra note 40, at 134. 
 45. See App. 2; see also Kabat, supra note 40, at 134. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1230 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 91:1219 
 
 
 
 
vires or preempted,
46
 but many survived appeals to the state judiciary or 
legislature to invalidate them.
47
 States like Illinois, Maryland, New York, 
and Ohio enacted comprehensive bans soon after populous cities within 
the state had adopted their own bans.
48
 Without local action, it is 
questionable whether second-hand smoke restrictions would have 
proliferated to the extent that they have.
49
 In large part due to the extensive 
local action on this matter, tens of millions more Americans now live in 
jurisdictions with smokefree laws than did at the turn of the twenty-first 
century.
50
 
In just the last few years, a number of cities have supplemented their 
second-generation regulations with bans on smoking in outdoor public 
spaces like parks and beaches.
51
 Some others cities have instead, or in 
addition, banned smoking in shared living spaces like apartment 
buildings.
52
 Because the scope of this third generation of restrictions on 
second-hand smoke is just emerging, it is not included in Part V’s 
horizontal comparison.
53
 Nonetheless, these third-generation ordinances, 
 
 
 46. E.g., Modern Cigarette, Inc. v. Town of Orange, 774 A.2d 969, 976 (Conn. 2001); Lexington 
Fayette Cnty. Food & Beverage Ass’n v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov't, 131 S.W.3d 745, 748 
(Ky. 2004); Tri-Nel Mgmt., Inc. v. Bd. of Health of Barnstable, 741 N.E.2d 37, 40 (Mass. 2001); 
Amico's, Inc. v. Mattos, 789 A.2d 899, 901 (R.I. 2002). 
 47. E.g., Tri-Nel Mgmt., Inc., 741 N.E.2d at 40 (upholding local smoking ban). 
 48. See App. 2 (citing Illinois’s law); Kabat, supra note 40, at App. A (citing statewide bans as of 
2008); see also id. at 148–56 (noting that Ohio’s statewide smoking ban was enacted by popular vote).  
 49. See Diller, supra note 11, at 461.  
 50. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Comprehensive Smoke-Free Laws—50 Largest 
U.S. Cities, 2000 and 2012, 61 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 914, 914–15 (2012) 
(concluding that among the fifty largest cities in the United States, thirty cities, with a combined 
population of thirty-one million, are now covered by either a state or local comprehensive smokefree 
regulation, as compared to one such city in 2000). For some reason, the CDC study does not classify 
California’s relatively strict smokefree statute as “comprehensive”; if it did, the number of cities and 
persons in smokefree jurisdictions would have been even higher (in both 2000 and 2012). 
 51. See James L. Repace, Benefits of Smoke-Free Regulations in Outdoor Settings: Beaches, Golf 
Courses, Parks, Patios, and in Motor Vehicles, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1621, 1623–28 (2008) 
(reviewing such bans). 
 52. Most of these bans apply only to public housing, see Alvin L. Arnold et al., Smoking Bans: 
Legal Considerations, 37 REAL ESTATE L. REP., May 2008, at 7, 7, but at least one city has banned 
smoking in privately owned apartments and condominiums. See, e.g., San Rafael, Cal., Ordinance 
1908 (Oct. 15, 2012) (codified at SAN RAFAEL, CAL., CODE §§ 9.04.070–9.04.080) (banning smoking 
in private duplexes and multifamily residences); see also Will Jason, San Rafael Officials Approve 
Tough New Smoking Rules, MARIN INDEP. J. (Oct. 1, 2012), http://www.marinij.com/ci_216769741 
san-rafael-officials-approve-tough-new-smoking-rules# (noting that San Rafael was the first city “to 
ban smoking in all apartments and condos”). 
 53. In addition, many of these third-generation smokefree ordinances apply only to publicly 
owned spaces and are therefore less likely to incur the same degree of profit-based opposition (e.g., 
from bars or restaurants) as second-generation laws. To the extent that they apply to private residences, 
like San Rafael’s ordinance, it is not clear that intense profit-based opposition will be aroused either. 
See, e.g., Joshua Sabatini, Proposal Would Require Landlords to Designate Non-Smoking Apartments, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss5/7
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as examples of cities regulating the public health to a greater degree than 
state or federal law, merit continued attention as they emerge.  
3. Restrictions on Retail Practices and Flavoring 
In addition to outdoor advertising restrictions and second-hand smoke 
regulations, cities have led in adopting a number of other tobacco control 
mechanisms, often focusing on preventing youth access to tobacco, 
whether directly or indirectly. To be sure, the federal and state 
governments have been active in this area as well. For instance, in 1992 
Congress included the Synar Amendment in its comprehensive drug and 
substance abuse legislation.
54
 The Amendment, which remains federal law, 
conditions the receipt of federal substance-abuse treatment funds on a state 
legally prohibiting minors from purchasing cigarettes, as well as other 
benchmarks aimed at reducing youth smoking.
55
 The Synar Amendment 
ensured that every state would enact or retain a law requiring purchasers of 
tobacco products to be at least eighteen years old.
56
 The FDA solidified 
this status quo as national policy in 2010 through a regulation promulgated 
pursuant to the TCA.
57
 Also in 2010, the FDA restricted tobacco vending 
machines to locations where persons under eighteen are not permitted and 
significantly curtailed the offering of free samples of tobacco products.
58
 
The FDA’s restriction on tobacco vending machines largely mirrored the 
 
 
S.F. EXAMINER (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.sfexaminer.com/local/2012/11/proposal-would-require-
landlords-designate-non-smoking-apartments (last visited Jan. 26, 2014) (noting that both landlord and 
tenant groups have advocated for smokefree housing ordinances). 
 54. Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration Reorganization Act, Pub. L. 102-
321, 106 Stat. 323 (1992) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300x-26 (2012)). The popular name for this 
provision comes from its primary sponsor in the House, Representative Mike Synar of Oklahoma. See 
Synar Program Factsheet, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN. (Jan. 14, 2011), 
http:// www.samhsa.gov/prevention/synarFactsheet.aspx. 
 55. See 42 U.S.C. § 300x-26. 
 56. Although all states have required purchasers of tobacco to be eighteen at least since 1994, see 
INST. OF MED., GROWING UP TOBACCO FREE: PREVENTING NICOTINE ADDICTION IN CHILDREN AND 
YOUTHS 201 (Barbara S. Lynch & Richard S. Bonnie eds., 1994) (“[A]ll states prohibit the sale of 
tobacco to minors . . . .”), it is unclear whether any state legislatures passed such laws directly in 
response to the Synar Amendment. See id. (noting that some states repealed their youth access laws in 
the 1960s, and counting forty-four states with youth access laws in 1990, but not identifying any states 
that passed youth access laws specifically in response to the Synar Amendment). Regardless, it is clear 
that states passed other measures in order to comply with the Amendment’s provisions regarding youth 
access enforcement. See Shipan & Volden, supra note 11, at 831 (analyzing the Synar Amendment’s 
impact on state legislation). 
 57. See supra text accompanying note 35 (discussing TCA); 21 C.F.R. § 1140.14(a) (2013) (“No 
retailer may sell cigarettes or smokeless tobacco to any person younger than 18 years of age . . . .”). As 
the FDA regulation does not apply to cigars or other non-cigarette smoked tobacco products, the Synar 
Amendment retains some bite. 
 58. 21 C.F.R. §§ 1140.1–1140.34. 
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efforts many cities had taken in the prior two decades.
59
 During the 1990s, 
a number of cities restricted or banned vending machines to a greater 
degree than restricted by state law,
60
 with many states later following 
suit.
61
  
The TCA expressly allows states and localities to continue to adopt 
more restrictive regulations regarding the sale and marketing of tobacco 
products.
62
 Some states and cities have since taken additional action like 
raising the legal age for purchasing tobacco products to nineteen or 
higher.
63
 Among top twenty-five cities, New York City joined a handful of 
smaller Massachusetts cities in raising the legal buying age to a nation-
high of twenty-one.
64
 Cities and states have also stiffened the storage and 
sale requirements for retailers.
65
 Because these measures specifically aim 
to restrict youth access to tobacco products, Big Tobacco may be estopped 
from lobbying against them by the MSA.
66
  
 
 
 59. See, e.g., Jean L. Forster et al., Survey of City Ordinances and Local Enforcement Regarding 
Commercial Availability of Tobacco to Minors in Minnesota, United States, 5 TOBACCO CONTROL 46, 
46 (1996) (noting that 25% of 222 Minnesota cities had enacted ordinances restricting cigarette 
vending machines). 
 60. E.g., Allied Vending, Inc. v. City of Bowie, 631 A.2d 77, 78 (Md. 1993) (considering 
implied preemption challenge under state law to local tobacco vending machine restrictions). 
 61. See Julie A. Fishman et al., State Laws on Tobacco Control—United States, 1998, CDC 
MMWR, June 25, 1999, at 21, available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ 
ss4803a2.htm (listing state laws regulating vending machine placement as of 1998 in “table 8”). Some 
of the state laws focused on restricting tobacco vending machine locations in or near schools. See id. 
 62. Family Smoking Prevention & Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 101, 123 Stat. 
1776 (2009) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2012)). 
 63. As of 2010, only four states (Alabama, Alaska, Utah, and New Jersey) required that 
purchasers of cigarettes be at least nineteen years of age. COUNCIL OF N.Y.C., COMMITTEE REPORT OF 
THE HUMAN SERVICES DIVISION, COMMITTEE ON HEALTH 10 (2013) [hereinafter, “N.Y.C. 
COMMITTEE REPORT”] (also noting that three New York counties outside of New York City raised the 
tobacco buying age to nineteen); see also Franklin Tucker, Belmont to Up Tobacco Legal Age to 19, 
BELMONT PATCH (May 2, 2012, 1:36 AM), http://belmont.patch.com/articles/belmont-to-up-tobacco-
legal-age-to-19 (noting that Belmont, Brookline, and Needham, Mass., raised the tobacco-buying age 
to nineteen). Under the TCA, the FDA is prohibited from raising the tobacco-buying age above 
eighteen. TCA, 21 U.S.C. § 387f(d)(3) (2012). 
 64. See N.Y.C. Local Law 94, Int. No. 250-A (2013) (amending N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 17-
706); see also Press Release, The Council of N.Y.C., Speaker Quinn, Health Comm’r Farley, Council 
Members, Announce NYC Will Be First Big City in Nation to Raise Minimum Smoking Age from 18 
to 21 (Apr. 22, 2013), http://council.nyc.gov/html/pr/042213smoking.shtml (noting that “[s]everal 
towns in the U.S. have raised the tobacco purchase age to 21,” but citing only Needham and Canton, 
Mass.).  
 65. E.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1399-cc(7) (McKinney 2012) (requiring retailers to keep 
tobacco products behind a counter accessible only to store personnel or in a locked container).  
 66. See MSA, supra note 16, at 29. On the other hand, these policies are not specifically 
mentioned in the MSA’s list of policies that settling tobacco companies may not oppose. Id. at F-1. 
Moreover, allied industries like convenience stores are free to oppose such policies even if Big 
Tobacco’s clout is missing. 
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Another tactic that is not specifically aimed at youth, but that restricts 
the public’s access to tobacco generally is prohibiting the sale of tobacco 
products in health and educational settings. Most notably, cities have 
forbidden pharmacies from selling tobacco. Among the top twenty-five 
cities, San Francisco and Boston have adopted such policies; other 
jurisdictions include Richmond County, California, and many smaller 
Massachusetts cities.
67
 Although legislators in six states have proposed 
similar statewide bans, none have yet passed.
68
  
New York City’s 2009 regulation requiring that retail vendors of 
cigarettes post prominently graphic warning signs near cigarette sale areas 
was an additional, significant local effort to change the tobacco retail 
environment.
69
 Although federal legislation has required that cigarette 
packages include a warning label
70
 (and, in doing so, has preempted state 
and local governments from imposing additional or different packaging 
requirements
71
), there is no such express preemption of the retail 
environment. By requiring graphic warning signs, New York City hoped 
to dissuade potential customers from buying tobacco.
72
 Cigarette 
manufacturers and sellers immediately challenged the regulation as both a 
 
 
 67. See S.F., Cal., Ordinance 194-08 (Aug. 7, 2008) (codified as amended at S.F., CAL., HEALTH 
CODE §§ 1009.91–.98 (2013)); Bos. Pub. Health Comm’n Regulation Restricting the Sale of Tobacco 
Products in the City of Boston, BOS. PUB. HEALTH COMM’N (2008), available at http://www.bphc.org/ 
whatwedo/tobacco-free-living/documents/TobaccoRestrictionRegulation_12-08.pdf (applying ban to 
hospitals, doctors’ offices, and educational institutions as well); see also Local Legislative Efforts by 
State, TOBACCO FREE RX, http://www.tobaccofreerx.com/local_efforts.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) 
(citing the ordinances and regulations adopted by Richmond County and Massachusetts cities). 
Opponents of the San Francisco ordinance challenged it in court as an unconstitutional violation of 
state and federal equal protection guarantees because it applied only to some pharmacies. After San 
Francisco’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint was denied, see Walgreen Co. v. City & County of 
S.F., 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 498 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010), the city amended the ordinance to apply to all stores 
with pharmacies in them. See S.F., Cal., Ordinance 245-10 (Oct. 6, 2010) (amending S.F., CAL., 
HEALTH CODE §§ 1009.91–98). 
 68. See Local Legislative Efforts by State, supra note 67 (citing bills introduced in Illinois, 
Massachusetts, New York, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and West Virginia). 
 69. See N.Y.C., N.Y., HEALTH CODE § 181.19 (2012). 
 70. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (“FCLAA”), Pub. L. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 
(1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–40 (2012)); Required Warnings for Cigarette 
Packages and Advertisements, 75 Fed. Reg. 69524 (proposed Nov. 12, 2010) (to be codified at 21 
C.F.R. pt. 1141); see also Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 513–15 (1992) (tracing history 
of federal labeling requirements). 
 71. See 15 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2012); see also Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 513–15 (discussing the 
history of federal preemption of labeling). 
 72. See Micaela H. Coady et al., Awareness and Impact of New York City’s Graphic Point-of-
Sale Tobacco Health Warning Signs, 22 TOBACCO CONTROL e51, e55-e56 (2013) (concluding that a 
requirement like New York City’s would be effective at reducing tobacco sales). 
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First Amendment violation and as impliedly preempted by federal law.
73
 
In July 2012, the Second Circuit held that federal law preempted the City’s 
regulation.
74
 At least one other city—Philadelphia—considered adopting a 
similar regulation, but has not yet enacted one, perhaps due to the more 
pronounced threat of litigation following the appellate decision 
invalidating New York City’s rule.75  
Cities have recently adopted another indirect method to curb youth 
access to tobacco in particular, as well as tobacco use in general. A 
handful of cities have sought to ban flavored tobacco products, albeit on 
the heels of some action by the federal government and one leading state. 
According to public health organizations and government regulators, 
tobacco companies have flavored their products for years in large part to 
lure young users into addiction.
76
 In response to this concern, Chicago 
passed an ordinance banning the sale of cigarettes and cigars with “sweet 
flavors” in 2005.77 The Chicago city council quickly repealed the 
ordinance, however, upon realizing that the ban could be construed as 
applying to menthol cigarettes as well.
78
 In 2007, Maine banned certain 
fruit and candy flavorings of cigars and cigarettes.
79
 In the 2009 TCA, 
Congress banned all flavorings of cigarettes except menthol.
80
 The federal 
ban, however, did not apply to smokeless tobacco products or non-
 
 
 73. See 23–34 94th St. Grocery Corp. v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 685 F.3d 174, 180 (2d Cir. 2012). 
The plaintiffs included Big Tobacco companies R.J. Reynolds, Philip Morris USA, and Lorillard. Id. at 
175. 
 74. Id. at 185–86. New York City did not seek a petition of certiorari from the Supreme Court 
from this decision, nor did it seek en banc review of the Second Circuit’s panel decision. 
 75. See DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, CITY OF PHILA, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: PROPOSED 
TOBACCO POINT OF SALE WARNINGS (2011), available at http://www.phila.gov/health/pdfs/ 
Frequently%20Asked%20Questions_8.5.11.pdf; see also Cnty. of L.A. Pub. Health, Press Release, 
Public Health News: First Ever Report Shows Smoking Rates by Local Community (June 22, 2010), 
http://www.publichealth.lacounty.gov/ha/reports/habriefs/2007/PressRelease.CitiesTobaccoUseReport.
6-22-10.pdf (encouraging jurisdictions to adopt retail warning sign requirements). 
 76. E.g., Carrie M. Carpenter et al., New Cigarette Brands With Flavors That Appeal to Youth: 
Tobacco Marketing Strategies, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1601, 1601 (2005). 
 77. See Chi., Ill., Amendment of Title 4, Chapter 64 of Municipal Code of Chicago by Addition 
of New Section 205 Prohibiting Flavored Tobacco Products Targeting Children (Nov. 1, 2005) 
(banning the sale of cigarettes and cigars with “sweet flavors”); see also Fran Spielman, After Mix-up, 
City Panel Repeals Ban on Candy-Flavored Cigarettes, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 27, 2006, available at 
LexisNexis. 
 78. See Spielman, supra note 77.  
 79. See 2007 Me. Legis. Serv. ch. 467 (West) (codified as amended at 22 ME. REV. STAT. 
§ 1560-D (2009)). In 2010, perhaps in response to the federal action described below, Maine amended 
the ban to apply only to cigars, and not cigarettes. 2010 Me. Legis. Serv. ch. 606 (West) (amending 22 
ME. REV. STAT. § 1560-D). 
 80. Family Smoking Prevention & Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 907, 123 Stat. 
1776 (2009) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 387g (2012)) (banning “artificial” and “natural flavor” additives, 
except for menthol). 
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cigarette smoked tobacco products like cigars.
81
 Since 2009, a handful of 
cities have sought to fill this regulatory void by banning all, or at least 
more, flavored tobacco products than prohibited by the TCA. These cities 
include New York,
82
 alone among the top twenty-five, as well as 
Providence, Rhode Island.
83
 Among counties, Santa Clara, California, 
adopted a similar ban,
84
 and Miami-Dade, Florida, considered a ban but 
ultimately adopted a more limited measure.
85
  
The examples of local action discussed in this Section are by no means 
exhaustive. Moreover, products that transmit nicotine are evolving to 
include electronic cigarettes, which emit vapor rather than smoke and may 
present a new threat to public health.
86
 Nonetheless, the aforementioned 
examples illustrate the potential for cities to significantly change the 
regulatory framework surrounding tobacco use. Cities have encountered 
legal roadblocks in the form of the First Amendment and preemption, 
which have blunted the effect of some local regulations, and perhaps 
nipped in the bud the diffusion of such policies. Other regulations, 
however, like those mandating smokefree workplaces, have altered the 
 
 
 81. Id. (noting that the ban on flavored products is a “[s]pecial rule for cigarettes”). 
 82. See N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 17-715. The Second Circuit recently upheld New York 
City’s law against a preemption challenge brought by Altria Group subsidiaries that manufacture 
smokeless tobacco. See U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Mfg. Co. v. City of New York, 708 F.3d 428, 430 
(2d Cir. 2013); U.S. SMOKELESS TOBACCO CO., http://www.ussmokeless.com/en/cms/home/default. 
aspx (last visited Feb. 2, 2014) (describing itself as an “Altria company”). 
 83. See Providence, R.I., Ordinance 42 (Jan. 9, 2012) (codified at PROVIDENCE, R.I., MUN. CODE 
§§ 14-300–303; 14-308–310 (2012)). As with New York City’s flavored tobacco ban, Big Tobacco 
attacked Providence’s regulation as preempted by federal law, but the First Circuit recently upheld the 
ordinance. See Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets, Inc. v. City of Providence, R.I., 731 F.3d 71, 74 (1st 
Cir. 2013). 
 84. Santa Clara Cnty., Cal., Ordinance NS-300.832 (Oct. 13, 2010) (to be codified at SANTA 
CLARA CNTY., CAL., ORDINANCE CODE § A18-369(h)). 
 85. See Memorandum from R.A. Cuevas, Jr., Cnty. Attorney, Miami-Dade Cnty, to Bd. of Cnty. 
Comm’rs, Miami-Dade Cnty. (Sept. 11, 2013) (discussing a proposed ordinance, introduced on May 1, 
2012, to ban the sale of flavored tobacco products); Miami-Dade County, Fla., Ord. No. 13-07 
(codified at 1 MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 8A-8–8.4 (2013)) (restricting the retail placement 
of flavored tobacco products and their sale to minors). 
 86. See Sabrina Tavernise, A Hot Debate Over E-Cigarettes as Path to Tobacco, or From It, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/23/health/a-hot-debate-over-e-
cigarettes-as-a-path-to-tobacco-or-from-it.html. Some cities (and states) are expanding their smokefree 
indoor air laws to prohibit the use of e-cigarettes indoors, see, e.g., N.Y.C. Local Law 152, Int. No. 
1210-A (amending N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 17-502 to 17-513.4) (expanding City’s Smoke-Free Air 
Act to prohibit the use of electronic cigarettes in indoor public spaces), as well as restricting the sale of 
e-cigarettes to minors. See N.Y.C. Local Law 94, supra note 63 (amending N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE 
§§ 17-702 & 706 (establishing a minimum sales age of twenty-one for electronic cigarettes). 
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regulatory framework substantially, often propelling higher levels of 
government to adopt similar regulations.
87
    
B. Local Obesity Prevention Strategies 
As compared to tobacco, public awareness of the nation’s obesity 
problem is more recent, having attracted the attention of policymakers 
only in the last decade or so.
88
 Unlike tobacco use and second-hand 
smoke, which are linked directly to ailments like lung cancer and heart 
disease, the causal chain between the various causes of obesity and the 
negative health effects (such as diabetes, hypertension, and heart disease) 
is less direct. While the food environment is one causal agent of obesity, 
many other factors—such as physical activity, land-use planning, sleep, 
and breastfeeding—play a role.89 In part for this reason, it has been much 
more difficult for obese persons to use the torts system to obtain 
compensation from the sellers of food products that contribute to obesity 
than it has been for smokers to obtain relief from cigarette manufacturers 
in tobacco tort litigation.
90
 Relatedly, popular culture and the political 
system have often been less sympathetic to the obese, viewing them as 
suffering from a mere failure of willpower, as opposed to smokers 
ensnared by a chemically addictive product.
91
 This attitude helps explain 
the passage in half the states of “cheeseburger bills” that insulate the food 
industry from obesity-related tort claims.
92
 
Nonetheless, most public health experts and some public officials now 
recognize that while food products may not be solely or even primarily 
responsible for obesity, they play a significant causal role in the epidemic, 
and any comprehensive strategy to reduce obesity must address the 
 
 
 87. See Hills, supra note 11, at 28–39; Diller, supra note 11; but see Shipan & Volden, supra 
note 11, at 826 (finding that, under certain circumstances, local action can reduce the pressure on state 
legislatures to address an issue).  
 88. See Paul A. Diller, Combating Obesity with a Right to Nutrition, 101 GEO. L.J. 969, 972 
(2013). 
 89. Id. at 980–81. 
 90. See, e.g., Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (dismissing 
teen plaintiffs’ claims against McDonald’s brought under tort and consumer protection laws). 
 91. See generally Adam Benforado et al., Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in America, 53 
EMORY L.J. 1645 (2004) (showing that persons’ food choices are strongly influenced by context and 
circumstance, and criticizing the industry narrative of “free will” that blames obesity on the 
consumer). 
 92. See Cara L. Wilking & Richard A. Daynard, Beyond Cheeseburgers: The Impact of 
Commonsense Consumption Acts on Future Obesity-Related Lawsuits, 68 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 229, 230 
& n.7 (2013) (citing the twenty-five state “commonsense consumption acts” that were passed between 
2005 and 2012). 
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consumption side of the issue. In this regard, some public officials have 
focused on various steps to reduce the consumption of obesity-causing 
foods and drinks, as well as steps to promote the consumption of more 
nutritious foods. Some of these efforts—like reducing corn subsidies or 
changing the school lunch program—necessarily involve federal actors 
because they seek to change federal programs.
93
 Other efforts to regulate 
the food supply have relied on regulatory methods that are traditionally 
within the realm of state or local governments, such as increased sales 
taxes for soft drinks or using zoning to limit the prevalence of fast-food 
restaurants.
94
 With one exception, the measures discussed below are 
regulations that any level of government—local, state, or federal—could 
have enacted consistent with constitutional law and regulatory tradition, 
but instead cities took the lead. This Section highlights two regulations, in 
particular, in which city action propelled regulatory changes nationwide: 
trans fat bans and menu labeling. The Section then also discusses some 
other less widespread, but notable, efforts by cities to regulate the food 
environment to combat obesity.  
1. Trans Fat Bans 
About ten years ago, various scientific and medical organizations 
began to urge governments to reduce or ban the use of artificial trans 
fats,
95
 an additive to processed foods that has no nutritional value and is 
 
 
 93. See Alicia Harvie & Timothy A. Wise, Sweetening the Pot: Implicit Subsidies to Corn 
Sweeteners and the U.S. Obesity Epidemic (Tufts Univ. Global Dev. & Envtl. Inst., Policy Brief No. 
09-01, 2009), http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/PB09-01SweeteningPotFeb09.pdf; Healthy, 
Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-296, §§ 201–210, 124 Stat. 3183, 3214–16 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1753(b), 1758, & 1758b (Supp. IV 2011)); see also Lauren Kaplin, A National Strategy To 
Combat the Childhood Obesity Epidemic, 15 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 347, 367–79 (2011) 
(discussing changes to school lunch program mandated by the aforementioned Act). 
 94. See Leon Stafford, Soda Wars: Cities Seek Restrictions, Taxes to Curb Obesity, ATLANTA J.-
CONST. (Nov. 12, 2012, 6:32 AM), http://www.ajc.com/news/news/local/soda-wars-cities-seek-
restrictions-taxes-to-curb-o/nS4b2/ (noting that officials in Washington, D.C., and Cambridge, Mass., 
were considering emulating New York’s policy); Mark Bittman, Op-ed, The Food Movement Takes a 
Beating, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2012, 1:10 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/10/the-
food-movement-takes-a-beating/ (noting that soda companies spent $3.5 million to defeat soda tax 
referenda in California cities Richmond and El Monte); L.A., Cal., Ordinance 180103 (Sept. 14, 2008), 
available at http://clkrep.lacity.org/onlinedocs/2007/07-1658_ord_180103.pdf (establishing one-year 
moratorium on new fast-food restaurants in an area of the city with “over-concentration” of same). 
 95. PUB. HEALTH LAW CTR., TRANS FAT BANS: POLICY OPTIONS FOR ELIMINATING THE USE OF 
ARTIFICIAL TRANS FATS IN RESTAURANTS 4–5 (2008), available at http://publichealthlawcenter.org/ 
sites/default/files/resources/phlc-policy-trans-fat.pdf [hereinafter PHLC, TRANS FAT]. 
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linked to coronary heart disease and high cholesterol.
96
 In the United 
States, New York City was the first jurisdiction to ban trans fats in 
restaurants in December 2006, with the ban going into effect in July 
2007.
97
 Other cities and counties followed suit; as of January 2013, three 
other top twenty-five cities (Baltimore, Boston, and Philadelphia) had 
adopted bans, as well as numerous other smaller cities.
98
 Several counties 
banned trans fats as well, one of which, King County, Washington, 
includes top twenty-five city Seattle.
99
 In July 2008, California became the 
first and only state to ban trans fats, with the ban going into effect in 
January 2010.
100
 In November 2013, the FDA announced for the first time 
that it was considering an outright ban on trans fats in processed foods.
101
 
2. Menu Labeling 
Although the federal government has required packaged foods to bear a 
label that informs consumers of product and nutritional information since 
1990,
102
 this requirement did not apply to restaurants.
103
 Hence, when 
eating outside the home, consumers often had little or no knowledge of the 
nutritional content of their food choices. In 2006, New York City became 
 
 
 96. INST. OF MED., DIETARY REFERENCE INTAKES FOR ENERGY, CARBOHYDRATE, FIBER, FAT, 
FATTY ACIDS, CHOLESTEROL, PROTEIN, AND AMINO ACIDS 423 (2005), available at http://www.nap. 
edu/openbook.php?isbn=0309085373&page=423. 
 97. See Notice, Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, Bd. of Health, City of N.Y.C., Notice of 
Adoption of an Amendment (§ 81.08) to Article 81 of the New York City Health Code (Dec. 5, 2006), 
available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/public/notice-adoption-hc-art81-08.pdf.  
 98. See BOS. PUB. HEALTH COMM’N, A REGULATION TO RESTRICT FOODS CONTAINING 
ARTIFICIAL TRANS FAT IN THE CITY OF BOSTON (2008), http://www.bphc.org/boardofhealth/ 
regulations/Documents/Trans_Fat_Regulation.pdf; See Phila., Pa., Ordinance 060958 (Feb. 15, 2007) 
(codified as amended at PHILA., PA., MUN. CODE § 6-307 (2013)); Balt., Md., Ord. No. 08-0034 (Mar. 
20, 2008) (codified at BALT., MD., HEALTH CODE § 6-507 (2013)); PHLC, TRANS FAT, supra note 95, 
at 9 (listing trans fat bans by cities, including Albany, New York, and Brookline, Mass.). Cleveland 
passed a trans fat ban in 2011 that the state legislature preempted soon after. See Cleveland v. State, 
989 N.E.2d 1072, 1075 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013). Cleveland challenged the state’s attempted preemption 
as an unconstitutional interference with its home-rule powers. Id. An intermediate appeals court ruled 
in Cleveland’s favor, id., and the state declined to appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court. See Press 
Release, The Office of Councilman Joe Cimperman, Trans Fat Legislation (May 22, 2013), available 
at http://www.joecimperman.com/sites/default/files/documents/news/press%20release_trans%20fat% 
20lawsuit_0.pdf. 
 99. See PHLC, TRANS FAT, supra note 95, at 7 (listing county trans fat bans). 
 100. 2008 Cal. Stat. ch. 207, § 1 (A.B. 97) (codified as amended at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§ 114377 (2013)).  
 101. See Tentative Determination Regarding Partially Hydrogenated Oils, 78 Fed. Reg. 67169 
(proposed Nov. 8, 2013). 
 102. Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, § 2, 104 Stat. 2353–57 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2012)). 
 103. See id. 
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the first jurisdiction in the United States to require some subset of 
restaurants—primarily “chain” restaurants—to post calorie content 
information on their menus and menu boards.
104
 After an industry 
preemption challenge and an ensuing revision to the rule, New York 
City’s requirement took effect in 2008.105 Within a relatively short period 
of time, numerous other jurisdictions, including three other top twenty-five 
cities, adopted similar regulations.
106
 By 2010, five states had enacted 
menu labeling requirements.
107
 In 2010, Congress included a menu 
labeling provision in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(“ACA”) that applies to chain restaurants and vending machines108 and 
largely preempts state and local requirements.
109
 When the FDA issues the 
final regulations that put the ACA’s requirements into effect, menu 
labeling will have gone from a requirement in one city to national practice. 
3. Other Local Regulatory Efforts to Combat Obesity 
A handful of other regulatory efforts to combat obesity by local 
governments have achieved significant notoriety, even if they have not 
diffused to the extent of trans fat bans and menu labeling. The first such 
effort is San Francisco and Santa Clara County’s restrictions on 
restaurants linking toy giveaways with meals of low nutritional quality,
110
 
 
 
 104. See N.Y. State Restaurant Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(discussing the original N.Y.C. HEALTH CODE § 81.50, adopted in 2006). 
 105. Id. at 121–22. 
 106. These cities were Nashville, Philadelphia, and San Francisco. Jenny Upchurch, Nashville 
Restaurants Ordered to Post Calories, THE TENNESSEAN (Mar. 6, 2009), available at LexisNexis 
(noting that the city-county health department issued the rule); Phila., Pa., Ordinance 080167-A (Feb. 
14, 2008) (codified at PHILA., PA., HEALTH CODE § 6-308 (2010)); S.F., Cal., Ordinance 40-08 (Mar. 
18, 2008) (codified as amended at S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE § 468.3 (2013)). San Francisco also 
required that chain restaurants disclose nutritional information through media other than menu boards. 
See id. § 468.4. San Francisco suspended its ordinance when California passed a menu labeling law 
later in 2008, id. § 468.9, and the Tennessee state legislature preempted Nashville’s rule in 2010 by 
prohibiting unelected local agencies (like Nashville’s health department) from promulgating such 
rules. 2010 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 614. It also bears noting that the Board of Health of King County, 
Washington, promulgated a menu labeling rule in 2007 that applied to top twenty-five city Seattle. See 
KING CNTY., WASH., BD. OF HEALTH CODE § 5.10.016 (2010).  
 107. See Trans Fat & Menu Labeling Legislation, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES 
(Jan. 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/trans-fat-and-menu-labeling-legislation.aspx. 
 108. See ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 4205, 124 Stat. 119, 573–77 (2010) (codified at 21 U.S.C. 
§ 343(q)(5) (Supp. V 2011)). 
 109. Id. § 4205(c), (d) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a)(4); 21 U.S.C. § 343 note (2012)). 
 110. S.F., Cal., Ordinance 290-10 (codified as S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE §§ 471.1–471.9 (2013)); 
SANTA CLARA CNTY., CAL., CODE OF ORDS. §§ A18-350 to A18-355 (2010). The nutritional standards 
include limits on calories, sodium, fat, saturated fat, trans fats, and sugar. See id. 
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known pejoratively as “Happy Meal bans.”111 These ordinances aim to 
combat the scourge of youth obesity: in the last thirty years, the percentage 
of obese children has more than doubled while the rate of obese 
adolescents has quadrupled.
112
 Many public health analysts attribute part 
of the rise in youth obesity increased consumption of food prepared 
outside the home, especially fast food.
113
 Santa Clara County moved first, 
adopting its “Happy Meal” regulation by ordinance in 2010.114 Because it 
applied only to the unincorporated part of the county, Santa Clara’s act 
affected only “about a dozen fast-food outlets.”115 Later in 2010, the San 
Francisco Board of Supervisors enacted a similar ordinance with more 
practical bite that applied to many more restaurants.
116
 The toy giveaway 
restrictions have been met by significant media criticism,
117
 and fast food 
companies have sought to evade them by imposing a nominal charge for 
toys.
118
 Nonetheless, the regulations have arguably brought unflattering 
attention to the nutritional shortcomings of fast food marketed toward 
children, which may have indirectly affected industry practices. In 2011, 
for instance, McDonald’s added apple slices to its Happy Meals to 
improve their nutritional profile.
119
 
Even more controversial than the toy giveaway restrictions was New 
York City’s attempt to limit the portion sizes of sugar-sweetened 
 
 
 111. E.g., Sharon Bernstein, Supporters of Happy Meal Ban Predict Movement Will Spread, L.A. 
TIMES (Nov. 6, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/06/business/la-fi-happy-meal-20101106. 
The ordinances do not ban toy giveaways with meals; they just require that the meals meet certain 
nutritional standards. See id. 
 112. Childhood Obesity Facts, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc. 
gov/obesity/data/childhood.html (last visited June 18, 2014). 
 113. See, e.g., R. Rosenheck, Fast Food Consumption and Increased Caloric Intake: A Systematic 
Review of a Trajectory Towards Weight Gain and Obesity Risk, 9 OBESITY REVS. 535, 546 (2008) 
(reviewing sixteen studies and finding “strong evidence for the independent role of fast food 
consumption . . . hastening rates of weight gain or obesity”). 
 114. See Bernstein, supra note 111. 
 115. New Law: Hold the Fries or Hold the Toy, KTVU (Aug. 9, 2010, 7:43 AM), 
http://www.ktvu.com/news/news/new-law-hold-the-fries-or-hold-the-toy/nKgsC/. 
 116. Madison Park, Happy Meal Toys No Longer Free in San Francisco, CNN (Dec. 1, 2011, 
1:09 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/30/health/california-mcdonalds-happy-meals (noting that San 
Francisco’s ordinance would affect approximately fifty fast food restaurants in the city). 
 117. E.g., San Francisco’s Happy Meal Ban, THE DAILY SHOW WITH JON STEWART (Jan. 3, 
2011), http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/mon-january-3-2011/san-francisco-s-happy-meal-ban. 
 118. See Douglas Stanglin, McD, Burger King Outwit San Francisco’s Happy Meal Rules, USA 
TODAY (Dec. 1, 2011, 11:37 AM), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/ondeadline/post/2011/12/ 
mcdonalds-burger-king-outwit-san-franciscos-happy-meal-rules/1#.USP31VfRFy5. 
 119. See McDonald’s: Apple Slices in Every Happy Meal, USA TODAY (July 26, 2011, 6:28PM), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/food/2011-07-26-McDonalds-apples-happy-meal_n. 
htm. Perhaps unsurprisingly, McDonald’s steadfastly denied that this new practice was a reaction to 
the toy giveaway regulations. Id. 
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beverages purchased in certain retail environments.
120
 This regulation, 
promulgated by the City’s board of health, took aim at soda’s unique 
contribution to the obesity epidemic, among other health ills,
121
 and for 
that reason became known, inaccurately, as a “soda ban.”122 The regulation 
would have prohibited restaurants, mobile food carts, delis, and 
concessionaires from selling sugary drinks like soda in containers larger 
than sixteen ounces.
123
 Many media figures and politicians viciously 
mocked the rule as an unduly paternalistic interference with the 
supposedly “free” choices of consumers.124 The rule spurred a million-
dollar-plus industry advertising campaign in opposition.
125
 Most 
significantly, an industry-led lawsuit challenging the rule as a violation of 
the state constitution’s separation-of-powers doctrine ultimately, and 
surprisingly, led to the rule’s invalidation.126 No other city or state has 
adopted a portion-cap rule, but officials in a handful of cities expressed 
interest, at least initially.
127
 Given the surprising success of the lawsuit 
challenging the rule, it is now questionable whether the rule will even 
survive in New York City, much less diffuse to other jurisdictions. 
 
 
 120. See N.Y.C., N.Y, HEALTH CODE § 81.53 (2013). 
 121. See COMM. ON ACCELERATING PROGRESS IN OBESITY PREVENTION, INST. OF MED., 
ACCELERATING PROGRESS IN OBESITY PREVENTION: SOLVING THE WEIGHT OF THE NATION 167 (Dan 
Glickman et al. eds., 2012) (identifying sugary drinks as “the single largest contributor of calories and 
added sugars to the American diet”); Gail Woodward-Lopez et al., To What Extent Have Sweetened 
Beverages Contributed to the Obesity Epidemic?, 14 PUB. HEALTH NUTRITION 499, 505 (2010) 
(concluding that sweetened beverage intake “has made a substantive contribution to the obesity 
epidemic experienced in the USA in recent decades”); Vasanti S. Malik et al., Intake of Sugar-
Sweetened Beverages and Weight Gain: A Systematic Review, 84 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 274, 
274 (2006) (“The weight of epidemiologic and experimental evidence indicates that a greater 
consumption of [sugar-sweetened beverages] is associated with weight gain and obesity.”); see also 
K.E. Heller et al., Sugared Soda Consumption and Dental Caries in the United States, 80 J. DENTAL 
RES. 1949, 1949 (2001) (finding significant associations between soda consumption and decayed, 
missing, or filled surfaces of teeth for persons over twenty-five years of age). 
 122. E.g., Joe Coscarelli, Fight Over Bloomberg’s Soda Ban Gets a Little Bit Racial, N.Y. MAG. 
(Jan. 23, 2013, 9:01 AM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2013/01/naacp-hispanic-group-join-
fight-over-soda-ban.html. 
 123. N.Y.C., N.Y., HEALTH CODE § 81.53. 
 124. E.g., Drink Different, THE DAILY SHOW WITH JON STEWART (May 31, 2012), http://www.the 
dailyshow.com/watch/thu-may-31-2012/drink-different. 
 125. Michael M. Grynbaum, Health Panel Approves Restriction on Sale of Large Sugary Drinks, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/14/nyregion/health-board-approves-
bloombergs-soda-ban.html. 
 126. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & 
Mental Hygiene, 2014 N.Y. Slip. Op. at 8, 2014 WL 2883881 (N.Y. Ct. App. June 26, 2014). For 
more analysis of the lower court decisions that were affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals, see 
Paul A. Diller, Local Health Agencies, the Bloomberg Soda Rule, and the Ghost of Woodrow Wilson, 
41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1859 (2013). 
 127. See Stafford, supra note 94. 
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In addition to the toy giveaway and portion-cap restrictions, cities have 
led in proposing other methods to combat obesity. For instance, in 2010 
New York City requested that the USDA, which administers the 
supplemental nutrition assistance program (“SNAP”), exclude SNAP 
recipients in the city from using their benefits to purchase soda.
128
 New 
York City could not implement this proposal unilaterally. Rather, given 
SNAP’s structure, it needed state and federal permission to move forward 
with its policy proposal.
129
 Although the state approved the change, the 
USDA declined to grant a waiver.
130
 At least one state, Minnesota, 
proposed something similar, but was also denied permission.
131
 While not 
ultimately successful, New York City’s proposal received widespread 
media attention and may have spurred more interest in nutrition-focused 
SNAP reform among policymakers in other jurisdictions.
132
 Indeed, the 
USDA has since conducted a pilot program in Hampden County, 
Massachusetts, in which SNAP participants were given financial 
incentives to buy fruits and vegetables.
133
 
In sum, cities have a prolific record of enacting public health 
regulations beyond the state and federal regulatory floor. Part V will 
examine cities’ adoptions of these policies comparatively, in an attempt to 
suggest which characteristics of cities may make them more likely to 
adopt such policies. As Part V will discuss, one such characteristic is the 
presence of an aggressive public health agency. Parts II through IV, 
however, focus primarily on differences between big city governments 
 
 
 128. Anemona Hartocollis, New York Asks to Bar Use of Food Stamps to Buy Sodas, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 6, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/07/nyregion/07stamps.html. New York City’s 
request to adjust SNAP purchase eligibility was made by the executive branch alone; a proposed city 
council resolution to support the request never made it out of committee. See N.Y.C., N.Y., Council 
Res. No. 0768-2011. 
 129. See Hartocollis, supra note 128. 
 130. See Letter from Jessica Shahin, Assoc. Admin., SNAP, USDA, to Elizabeth R. Berlin, Exec. 
Deputy Comm’r, N.Y. State Office of Temporary & Disability Assistance (Aug. 19, 2011), available 
at http://www.foodpolitics.com/wp-content/uploads/SNAP-Waiver-Request-Decision.pdf. 
 131. Minnesota sought to exclude candy and soft drinks. See Letter from Ollice C. Holden, Reg’l 
Admin., Food Stamp Program, Food & Nutrition Serv., USDA, to Maria Gomez, Assistant Comm’r, 
Econ. & Cmty. Support Strategies, Minn. Dep’t of Human Servs. (May 4, 2004), available at 
http://heartland.org/sites/all/modules/custom/heartland_migration/files/pdfs/15364.pdf.  
 132. Monica Eng, Politicians, Health Advocates Seek Transparency Restrictions in Food Stamp 
Program, CHI. TRIB. (June 20, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-06-20/news/ct-nw-food-
stamp-spending-20120620_1_food-stamp-junk-food-supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program (noting 
that “[l]awmakers in several states . . . have unsuccessfully pushed bills to make soda, chips, and 
candy ineligible for purchase with food stamps”).  
 133. USDA, HEALTHY INCENTIVES PILOT (HIP): INTERIM REPORT 5 (2013), available at 
http://www.fns.usda.gov/sites/default/files/HIP_Interim.pdf (concluding that “HIP had positive 
impacts on targeted fruit and vegetable consumption of pilot participants”). 
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(considered as a class) and the state and federal governments. In doing so, 
the Article will assume that administrative action is taken pursuant to the 
direction of elected actors, an assumption that Part V relaxes.  
II. WHY HEIGHTENED LOCAL REGULATION IS REMARKABLE 
That cities have regulated Big Tobacco and the Food Industry more 
stringently for the purpose of improving public health is remarkable for a 
number of reasons. Although the public health community has long 
identified local governments as a fertile venue for increased regulation,
134
 
prominent scholarly narratives in law, economics, and political science, by 
contrast, posit that cities are unlikely to adopt regulations that go beyond 
the state and national regulatory floors. This Part discusses those 
narratives, analyzing why they are incorrect in the context of public health. 
In assessing these accounts, this Part asks what, if anything, we might 
draw from them to explain why cities actually are innovating in the realm 
of public health. Before proceeding with the accounts specific to local 
government, this Part looks at public choice theory, which, as noted above, 
would generally predict under-regulation. 
A. Public Choice Theory and Economic Incentives 
Public choice assumes that government officials, like all people, 
“rationally” seek to maximize their utility,135 thus rejecting the notion that 
legislatures or administrative agencies regulate for the “public good.”136 
Although scholars have debated whether public choice is merely 
descriptive or necessarily normative,
137
 this Article uses the theory 
descriptively to help determine why cities produce different governmental 
 
 
 134. See, e.g., TOBACCO CONTROL RES. CTR., THE MULTISTATE MASTER SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT AND THE FUTURE OF STATE AND LOCAL TOBACCO CONTROL: AN ANALYSIS OF 
SELECTED TOPICS AND PROVISIONS OF THE MULTISTATE MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT OF 
NOVEMBER 23, 1998 § 8.1, at 61 (Graham Kelder & Patricia Davidson eds., 1999) (observing that 
local governments have “led the way in developing innovative, effective, and enforceable measures 
regulating the sale, distribution, and use of tobacco products”). 
 135. See, e.g., Dennis C. Mueller, Rational Egoism Versus Adaptive Egoism as Fundamental 
Postulate for a Descriptive Theory of Human Behavior, 51 PUB. CHOICE 3, 8 (1986); ANTHONY 
DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 2 (1967); JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE 
CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 31–39 (1962).  
 136. See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 135, at 31–39; DOWNS, supra note 135, at 2; see 
also Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and Reading 
of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1991). 
 137. See JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS & GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO 
IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 25–27 (1997) (recounting debate). 
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outputs than higher levels of government. According to classic public 
choice accounts, interest groups—organized collections of individuals 
who share an intense interest in a particular subject—influence the 
political process more than they would if all voters’ policy preferences 
were weighted equally.
138
 Given their uniquely intense interests, these 
groups invest substantial time, money, and effort in electing and lobbying 
public officials to achieve favorable governmental outputs like laws, 
regulations, tax rates, and subsidies.
139
 In seeking to influence government, 
interest groups prey on the self-interest of public decisionmakers, such as 
lawmakers, their staffs, administrative agency personnel, and civil 
servants.
140
 Public choice theorists generally work from the assumption 
that legislators are motivated most by re-election, but also allow for the 
possibility that other motivations—like post-elective office earnings, 
power, prestige, leisure, ideology, and a desire to act conscientiously—
drive legislators and other governmental decisionmakers.
141
  
According to conventional public choice theory, Big Tobacco, the 
Food Industry, and their allies on specific issues aim to block regulations 
that could hurt their profits.
142
 Since the benefits to the general population 
from government regulation are diffusely spread, support for public health 
regulation will often be weak.
143
 More recent versions of public choice 
theory—sometimes referred to as “neo-pluralist” accounts—acknowledge 
that there are, in fact, organized groups that at least purport to represent 
the diffuse interests of the public on certain issues.
144
 Environmental and 
consumer groups, for instance, undoubtedly influence the lawmaking 
 
 
 138. Political scientist Mancur Olson was a notable proponent of this view, arguing that powerful 
interest groups dominate the process of lobbying public bodies. See generally MANCUR OLSON, JR., 
THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965); see also 
TODD SANDLER, COLLECTIVE ACTION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS (1992); RUSSELL HARDIN, 
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982). 
 139. OLSON, supra note 138, at 144. 
 140. See CROLEY, supra note 32, at 26–52. 
 141. E.g., Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice, Phenomenology, and the Meaning of the Modern 
State: Keep the Bathwater, but Throw Out That Baby, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 309, 320–24 (2002) 
(discussing “deep ambivalence within public choice scholarship about whether the interests that 
constitute self-interest . . . are limited to material matters, or whether they extend to such discarnate 
concerns as power, prestige, and leisure”); DOWNS, supra note 135, at 84–85 (listing motives of 
bureaucrats). 
 142. See Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 34–41 (1998). 
 143. That is, unless there are other organized, discrete interest groups that stand to gain from 
regulation. See Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists: The Education of a Regulatory Economist, 7 
REG., May/June 1983, at 12, 12.  
 144. See Croley, supra note 142, at 57–60.  
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process to some degree.
145
 With respect to tobacco use, groups like the 
American Lung Association and the American Cancer Society often lobby 
for more stringent regulations. 
Despite the presence of opposing groups, until the 1980s, Big Tobacco 
exercised significant control over federal policy, routinely overpowering 
its organized public health opposition.
146
 Although the federal government 
adopted some significant tobacco regulations at discrete political 
moments, the industry’s political influence limited the scale and scope of 
such regulation. Big Tobacco’s political power began to wane in the 
1990s, however, after years of bad press from tort litigation and perceived 
obstinance to admitting tobacco’s devastating health effects.147 In addition, 
a significant reduction in the number of tobacco farmers, who allied with 
Big Tobacco on many issues, hurt the industry’s clout.148 Moreover, some 
elements of Big Tobacco began to realize that most of their profit and 
growth lay in overseas markets like China.
149
 Hence, by the time Congress 
passed the TCA in 2009, one major tobacco company—the Altria 
Group—decided that the public relations benefits of supporting the 
legislation might outweigh the negative impact on its business in the 
United States.
150
 (Reportedly, Altria also supported the legislation on the 
theory that increased regulation, particularly of advertising practices, 
would solidify its dominant position in the cigarette market).
151
 While 
perhaps not the political juggernaut it once was, Big Tobacco still spends 
 
 
 145. Id. at 59; Hills, supra note 11, at 32–33 (distinguishing “special interest groups” from “public 
interest groups”). 
 146. See Bruce Yandle et al., Bootleggers, Baptists & Televangelists: Regulating Tobacco by 
Litigation, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1225, 1233 & nn.21–22 (observing that the relatively weak “health 
interest groups” did “not aggressively challenge[] tobacco interests in many instances”); id. at 1244–55 
(tracing history of federal regulation of tobacco); Graham E. Kelder, Jr. & Richard A. Daynard, The 
Role of Litigation in the Effective Control of the Sale and Use of Tobacco, 8 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 
63, 66–68 (1997) (describing the tobacco industry’s influence over federal officials); see also CROLEY, 
supra note 32, at 181 (noting lack of significant federal regulation of cigarettes). 
 147. Yandle et al., supra note 146, at 1257–71; Duff Wilson, Tobacco Regulation Bill Is Expected 
to Pass Senate, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2009, at B4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/06/ 
business/06tobacco.html (noting that “[t]obacco regulation used to be a fight to the death in Congress,” 
but no longer). 
 148. The Shrinking Role of Tobacco Farming & Tobacco Product Manufacturing in the United 
States Economy, CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS (May 22, 2013), http://www.tobaccofreekids. 
org/research/factsheets/pdf/0344.pdf. 
 149. See Sokol, supra note 2, at 120–23 (noting that the Altria Group spun off Philip Morris 
International so as to better capitalize on less regulated foreign markets). 
 150. Duff Wilson, Senate Approves Tight Regulation Over Cigarettes, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2009, 
at A1.  
 151. Douglas McIntyre, Altria Wins Big with New FDA Regulation of Cigarettes, DAILYFINANCE 
(June 11, 2009, 6:30 PM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2009/06/11/altria-wins-big-with-new-fda-
regulation-of-cigarettes/ (last updated Dec. 3, 2009, 12:00 PM). 
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millions on campaign donations and lobbying, which undoubtedly allows 
it to retain substantial influence over public policy affecting it.
152
  
The Food Industry constitutes a lobby as powerful as the Tobacco 
Industry in its heyday, if not more so.
153
 At the federal level, the Food 
Industry has pushed Congress to overturn administrative regulations 
designed to reduce obesity,
154
 and successfully objected to inter-agency 
efforts to regulate the industry more stringently.
155
 It has opposed efforts 
to limit how SNAP benefits can be used.
156
 The soda industry, in 
particular, has spent millions to defeat local soda taxes.
157
 On the other 
side of the Food Industry are public health organizations like the Center 
for Science in the Public Interest (“CSPI”), which spends comparatively 
little on lobbying.
158
 First Lady Michelle Obama has brought attention to 
the obesity epidemic without advocating for increased regulation of the 
Food Industry.
159
 
 
 
 152. According to OpenSecrets, the Tobacco Industry spent $17 million on federal lobbying in 
2011 alone. Lobbying Spending Database Tobacco, 2011, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.open 
secrets.org/lobby/indusclient.php?id=a02&year=2011 (last visited Jan. 30, 2014). Altria Group led 
tobacco companies with $1.7 million in campaign contributions in 2011–12. Influence & Lobbying, 
Tobacco Summary, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.php?ind=a02 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2014); see also Paul A. LeBel & Richard C. Ausness, Toward Justice in Tobacco 
Policymaking: A Critique of Hanson and Logue and an Alternative Approach to the Costs of 
Cigarettes, 33 GA. L. REV. 693, 784–85 (1999) (explaining Big Tobacco’s successful resistance to 
federal regulatory legislation in the late 1990s in public choice terms). 
 153. See Duff Wilson & Janet Roberts, Special Report: How Washington Went Soft on Childhood 
Obesity, REUTERS (Apr. 27, 2012, 9:03 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/27/us-usa-
foodlobby-idUSBRE83Q0ED20120427 (noting that the food industry has followed “Big Tobacco’s 
playbook” in lobbying against federal regulation). 
 154. E.g., Pub. L. No. 112-55, 125 Stat. 552, § 743 (Nov. 18, 2011) (blocking funding for 
implementation of school lunch nutrition programs); Ron Nixon, Congress Blocks New Rules on 
School Lunches, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/16/us/politics/ 
congress-blocks-new-rules-on-school-lunches.html (noting that major food companies lobbied 
Congress to block administrative regulations that would have tightened school lunch nutrition 
standards). 
 155. See Wilson & Roberts, supra note 153. 
 156. See Robert Pear, Soft Drink Industry Fights Proposed Food Stamp Ban, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
29, 2011), http://nytimes.com/2011/04/30/us/politics/30food.html (noting opposition from major soft 
drink companies and distributors). 
 157. E.g., Bittman, supra note 94. 
 158. In 2011, for instance, the CSPI spent $159,310 on lobbying, including grassroots lobbying. 
CSPI, TAX FORM 990 (2010), at 21 (on file with author). Coca-Cola, by contrast, spent over $5 million 
on lobbying in 2011, see Lobbying Spending Database—Coca-Cola, 2011, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000000212&year=2011 (last visited Jan. 15, 
2014). See also Wilson & Roberts, supra note 153 (noting that the CSPI spent as much on lobbying in 
one year as industry opponents of obesity-prevention regulations spent every thirteen hours).  
 159. See Wilson & Roberts, supra note 153 (noting Michelle Obama’s shift, after intense Food 
Industry lobbying of the White House, “from criticizing foodmakers toward promoting exercise”). 
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Public choice does not forestall the possibility that government will 
ever impose costly regulations on powerful industries at discrete political 
moments.
160
 Rather, it predicts that it will be difficult politically to do so, 
and that if science or economics could prescribe an optimal amount of 
public health regulation, there are good reasons to expect the political 
system to under-regulate. Ceteris paribus, one would expect such 
regulation to be equally difficult at the local level. That cities regulate Big 
Tobacco and the Food Industry beyond the state and federal floor in many 
instances suggests that everything is not equal, and thus presses the 
question of why cities are more inviting “hosts” for the interest groups 
promoting public health regulation.
161
 
The need for a compelling explanation of local regulatory activism is 
all the more pressing because cities, as compared to states and the federal 
government, likely have less to gain financially from lowering the rates of 
tobacco use and obesity. Federally funded Medicare, as well as Medicaid 
(funded mostly by the federal government), bear billions in long-term 
medical costs associated with tobacco and obesity.
162
 Cities, by contrast, 
do not contribute any money to Medicare, and in most states, they 
contribute no or proportionally scant money to Medicaid.
163
 In some 
 
 
 160. For instance, the groundbreaking TCA was enacted during the brief moment in which the 
Democratic Party controlled the House of Representatives, the presidency, and had a filibuster-proof 
margin in the Senate. See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Earmarking Earmarking, 49 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 249, 265 (2012) (noting the “cliffhanger cloture vote” in the Senate that allowed the TCA to 
pass). 
 161. Cf. GRAEME BOUSHEY, POLICY DIFFUSION DYNAMICS IN AMERICA 15 (2010) (arguing that 
the extent of a policy’s diffusion depends in part on attributes of the “host” state’s governmental 
system). 
 162. In 2009, for instance, combined state-federal Medicaid spending was $380.6 billion, of which 
the federal government paid sixty-six percent and states (or their sub-entities, see infra note 163) paid 
thirty-four percent. Kathryn Linehan, The Basics: Medicaid Financing, NAT’L HEALTH POLICY 
FORUM (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.nhpf.org/library/the-basics/Basics_MedicaidFinancing_02-13-
13.pdf; see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012) (“Medicaid 
spending accounts for over 20 percent of the average State’s total budget, with federal funds covering 
50 to 83 percent of those costs.”). For more on how the 2010 Affordable Care Act will affect state 
Medicaid budgets, see id. at 2601–07 (invalidating ACA provision requiring states to expand Medicaid 
eligibility).  
 163. Federal law allows states to collect up to sixty percent of their Medicaid expenditures from 
local governments in order to receive matching funds. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2012). In practice, 
twenty-two states do not require any local funding, while most others require localities to pay only 
administrative costs or other minor expenses. See CITIZENS BUDGET COMM’N OF N.Y., A POOR WAY 
TO PAY FOR MEDICAID: WHY NEW YORK SHOULD ELIMINATE LOCAL FUNDING FOR MEDICAID 
(2011), available at http://www.cbcny.org/sites/default/files/REPORT_Medicaid_12122012.pdf. Only 
six states—Arizona, California, Iowa, New Hampshire, New York, and North Carolina—require a 
local contribution that amounts to more than two percent of total state Medicaid spending, with New 
Hampshire (8.4 percent in 2008) and New York (thirteen percent) the only states to require a 
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states, cities and counties run or help fund public hospitals, which treat a 
disproportionate share of low-income patients reliant on Medicaid (which 
often reimburses medical care at lower rates) or who lack health insurance 
entirely.
164
 Cities and counties that fund public hospitals thus also have a 
long-term financial interest in reducing public health problems that may 
strain their public hospital budgets.
165
 Nevertheless, in terms of consistent, 
ultimate liability for medical costs, the state and federal governments bear 
much more of the financial burden caused by obesity and tobacco.
166
 
In one sense, state and federal officials’ comparative nonchalance 
regarding the budgetary effects of tobacco use and obesity may seem 
consistent with public choice’s skeptical view of legislators’ interests. So 
long as no powerful interest group is hurt by these budgetary problems, 
legislators should not give a whit. However, some politicians may be 
motivated by concerns other than self-interest, and, moreover, there are 
organized interest groups devoted to reducing government spending, debt, 
or pursuing balanced budgets.
167
 Thus, it may actually be in some or even 
most politicians’ interests to pursue policies that promote the fiscal 
soundness of the level of government to which they are elected. If so, then 
it is even more remarkable that local governments, which have relatively 
less to gain financially from better public health, are at the vanguard of 
combating tobacco use and obesity. 
 
 
contribution greater than five percent. Id. at 11. New York State is moving toward reducing the local 
share of Medicaid spending. Id. at 12. 
 164. See TARESSA FRAZE ET AL., STATISTICAL BRIEF NO. 95: PUBLIC HOSPITALS IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 2008, at 3 (2010), available at http://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/reports/statbriefs/sb95.pdf 
(noting that 24.5 percent of patients in public hospitals are covered by Medicaid as compared to 17.3 
percent in non-profit hospitals, and that public hospitals cover seventy-five percent more uninsured 
patients).  
 165. In part due to the strain they exert on city budgets, city ownership of public hospitals is 
steadily declining. See Dennis P. Andrulis & Lisa M. Duchon, The Changing Landscape of Hospital 
Capacity in Large Cities and Suburbs: Implications for the Safety Net in Metropolitan America, 84 J. 
URB. HEALTH 400, 400 (2007). 
 166. As compared to more than twenty percent for the average state budget, see Sebelius, 132 S. 
Ct. at 2604, Medicare and Medicaid consumed twenty-four percent of the federal budget in 2010. See 
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE CHARTBOOK 78 (4th ed. 2010), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation. 
files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8103.pdf. By contrast, New York City, which shoulders a greater share 
of state-local Medicaid spending than any other large city, is projected to spend 12.5 percent of the 
city-funded portion of its budget on Medicaid in 2014. N.Y. Indep. Budget Office., Fiscal Brief, 
October 2013, at 3, http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us/iboreports/medicaid2013.pdf. 
 167. E.g., About the Concord Coalition, THE CONCORD COAL., http://www.concordcoalition 
.org/about-concord-coalition (last visited Jan. 27, 2014) (“a nationwide, non-partisan, grassroots 
organization advocating generationally responsible fiscal policy”); About the Campaign, FIX THE 
DEBT, http://www.fixthedebt.org/about-the-campaign (last visited Jan. 27, 2014) (“a non-partisan 
movement” with “the common belief that America’s growing federal debt threatens our future and we 
must address it”). 
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B. Numerosity and Free Ridership 
Given that there are thousands of cities, as compared to a mere fifty 
states and one federal government, one might suspect, per Brandeis’s 
famous dicta about laboratories of democracy, that a greater number of 
cities will inevitably lead to more innovation at the local level.
168
 On the 
other hand, in her seminal article on the subject, Susan Rose-Ackerman 
argued powerfully that federalism actually decreases the possibility of 
policy innovation.
169
 Assuming that elected officials are only interested in 
winning re-election, she notes that there is relatively little to gain from a 
“successful” policy innovation, whereas a failure can hurt a candidate’s 
chances significantly.
170
 Thus, a self-interested, lower-level, elected 
official has little incentive to innovate. Moreover, because information 
about innovation diffuses to other jurisdictions, other policymakers may 
“free ride” on the first-mover’s innovation.171 Because innovation is costly 
and its political return speculative, the free-rider effect leads to a collective 
action problem in which the many jurisdictions wait for others to innovate 
first, thus producing sub-optimal policy innovation.
172
 One would expect 
the collective action problem to be greater when there are more 
jurisdictions; thus, cities should be less likely to innovate than states.
173
 
Rose-Ackerman’s theory relies on a number of stylized assumptions 
and recognizes that more innovation may occur in a two-tier federal 
system than in her hypothetical one-level, multijurisdictional system due 
to the possibility of lower-level officials seeking higher office.
174
 In the 
absence of incentives to innovate provided to lower levels of government 
by the central government, however, Rose-Ackerman expects the effects 
of federalism on innovation by multiple jurisdictions to be “weak.”175 
Rose-Ackerman’s work has spawned dozens of empirical and theoretical 
offshoots in the last three decades. Brian Galle and Joseph Leahy 
commendably synthesize these works in a comprehensive review.
176
 They 
 
 
 168. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  
 169. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 
9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593 (1980). 
 170. Id. at 595, 603–05. 
 171. Id. at 610–11. 
 172. Id. 
 173. See Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy Innovation in 
Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333, 1398–99 (2009) (noting that the free-rider effect 
increases with the number of competing jurisdictions). 
 174. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 169, at 614–15. 
 175. Id. at 615. 
 176. Galle & Leahy, supra note 173, at 1339. 
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largely conclude that Rose-Ackerman’s insight remains correct: large 
numbers of jurisdictions do not necessarily lead to more policy innovation, 
and, on the whole, the level of innovation to be expected will be “well 
below the socially optimal level.”177 
Cities’ extensive innovation with respect to public health regulation 
thus defies Rose-Ackerman’s negative view of decentralized 
government,
178
 perhaps showing that local officials are more risk-seeking 
than she acknowledges. Galle and Leahy recognize that “policy 
evangelists” may be particularly well-suited to overcoming the free-rider 
problem because they generally want other jurisdictions to copy their 
innovations.
179
 Perhaps, then, policy evangelism helps explain the local 
innovation in public health, but why evangelists achieve more success at 
the local level than at higher levels remains unanswered. Surely, the most 
evangelistic would prefer to impact the greatest number of people through 
their innovations, and thus should prefer to act at higher levels of 
government, everything being equal.  
Scholars also note that more populous and wealthier jurisdictions—
whether states or cities—are more likely to innovate given that they have 
more resources, including a larger bureaucracy, to devote to innovation.
180
 
As discussed in the next Section, more population density and greater 
wealth can also insulate cities from capital flight that regulation might 
otherwise precipitate. Relatedly, Graeme Boushey finds that at the state 
level, the more professional a legislature, the more receptive it is to 
regulatory policy innovation.
181
 These factors may help explain which 
local governments are more receptive to public health regulation. But as an 
explanation for why cities are generally more receptive to heightened 
regulation, they fall short. States are always larger and more populous than 
the cities within them. Moreover, given their control over taxation and 
finances, states can lay claim to a wealthy city’s revenue even if other 
 
 
 177. Id. at 1398. 
 178. Insofar as Rose-Ackerman and Galle-Leahy argue that innovation is sub-“optimal,” id., their 
claim is impossible to test empirically because the “optimal” level of innovation is unknown. 
 179. Id. at 1363, 1381. 
 180. Id. at 1367 & n. 153 (citing Shipan & Volden, supra note 11, at 24, for the proposition that 
large cities are the primary innovators among municipalities); BOUSHEY, supra note 161, at 96–97 
(finding that the size and wealth of a state correlate to its receptiveness to regulatory innovation). In 
more populous cities, a larger bureaucracy may include more and better-staffed administrative 
agencies, see infra Part V, as well as a larger and more sophisticated legal counsel office that may be 
more competent at reviewing and defending proposals. 
 181. BOUSHEY, supra note 161, at 93. 
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parts of the state are poorer.
182
 In addition, state legislatures will usually be 
as professional as, if not more so than, constituent city councils.  
C. Tiebout-ian Competition and Mobile Capital 
Charles Tiebout famously postulated that cities compete with each 
other for consumer-voters on the basis of the tax-service mix offered by 
the jurisdiction.
183
 Although Tiebout largely focused on more tangible 
public goods like schools and golf courses,
184
 his theory can be extended 
to include public health policies as among the “goods” offered to residents 
of a jurisdiction.
185
 Tiebout’s insights might militate in favor of heightened 
public health regulation if such regulation appeals to enough residents. 
Tiebout might also suggest a more malign explanation for public health 
regulation: cities might seek residents who prefer restrictive public health 
regulations because such residents will cost the city less in medical (and 
other social service) expenditures in the long run, or because individual 
preference for public health regulation is a proxy for other characteristics 
that cities aim to maximize, like high levels of income and education. In 
other words, squeeze out McDonald’s, and a city keeps out the poor 
people who work (and eat) there. For all of these reasons, the Tiebout 
theory may help explain heightened public health regulation, at least to the 
extent that it can explain any local action.
186
 
Upon further examination, however, the Tiebout-ian case for local 
public health innovation weakens. First, among the public goods that 
residents consider when choosing a community, public health policies 
likely rank quite low to the extent that they are known and considered at 
all.
187
 At the margins, there may be particularly ideological or sensitive 
 
 
 182. See GERALD E. FRUG & DAVID J. BARRON, CITY BOUND: HOW STATES STIFLE URBAN 
INNOVATION 76–87 (2008). 
 183. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 424 (1956). 
 184. Id. at 418 (discussing also “beaches, parks, police protection, roads, and parking facilities”). 
 185. See Clayton P. Gillette, Local Redistribution, Living Wage Ordinances, and Judicial 
Intervention, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1057, 1071–73 (2007) (noting that residents might choose a 
jurisdiction on the basis of redistributive policies like a “living wage” ordinance). 
 186. Tiebout, of course, relies on many stylized assumptions that limit the theory’s practical 
applicability. See Tiebout, supra note 183, at 419; see also Vicki Been, “Exit” As a Constraint on 
Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 
516–17 (1991) (discussing criticisms of Tiebout and his assumptions). 
 187. Indeed, the empirical research “testing” the Tiebout theory generally focuses exclusively on 
consumer-voter response to municipal expenditures on public goods like schools, police protection, 
and parks. See Been, supra note 186, at 520–28 (surveying studies on the issue). Moreover, surveys 
indicate that residents consider schools, taxes, and public safety the most important factors in choosing 
neighborhoods or cities. Id. at 523. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1252 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 91:1219 
 
 
 
 
persons who rank these policies quite high,
188
 but their numbers are 
probably relatively insignificant. Second, while Tiebout argued that 
competition among jurisdictions—at least for residents—would lead to 
greater efficiency, many other scholars argue that interlocal competition 
for businesses results in a “race to the bottom” in which cities offer more 
and more giveaways to mobile firms to the detriment of their tax bases and 
public services.
189
 Paul Peterson theorized that the threat of mobile capital 
renders cities unwilling and unlikely to legislate on “redistributive” 
matters that might scare off businesses.
190
 According to Peterson and his 
acolytes, city officials avoid ideological issues, concentrating instead on 
deciding how to allocate public goods.
191
 Per this narrative, cities should 
be loath to enact public health regulations that might chase away certain 
industries, especially because businesses are likely more sensitive to local 
regulation than residents are in choosing location.
192
   
As with residents, there is at least a plausible Tiebout-ian explanation 
of heightened public health regulations with respect to businesses. At least 
some cities might want to drive away the very businesses—e.g., fast-food 
outlets and convenience stores—that are among those to be hurt most by 
regulations to reduce tobacco use or obesity. Cities may be so motivated in 
part because the presence of these businesses negatively affects the public 
health (in a manner that may have fiscal implications for the city
193
), or 
because the city desires “better” businesses that provide higher-wage jobs 
and create a stronger tax base through higher earnings or higher real 
 
 
 188. For instance, residents with a particular dislike for secondhand smoke, perhaps for medical 
reasons, may value a strong smokefree workplace law when choosing a jurisdiction in which to live or 
work. 
 189. See Richard C. Schragger, Mobile Capital, Local Economic Regulation, and the Democratic 
City, 123 HARV. L. REV. 482, 495 n.39 (2009); see also Louise Story, As Companies Seek Tax Deals, 
Governments Pay High Price, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/02/us/ 
how-local-taxpayers-bankroll-corporations.html (describing economic harm from local governments’ 
competing for industry). 
 190. PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS 120–21, 183 (1981); see also Schragger, supra note 189, at 
483 (“The conventional economic story is that it is quite difficult (and counterproductive) for 
subnational governments to . . . engage in redistribution.”). 
 191. E.g., KAREN M. KAUFMANN, THE URBAN VOTER: GROUP CONFLICT & MAYORAL VOTING 
BEHAVIOR IN AMERICAN CITIES 18–19 (2004) (“Local governments . . . are principally service 
providers. . . . The majority of [their] decisions are less policy driven than they are allocational in 
nature.”); see also WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY & REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 
130 (1971) (“In our increasingly mobile age . . . local politics are increasingly irrelevant.”). 
 192. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 
346, 421 (1990) (observing that “investors of capital and owners of businesses, rather than residents, 
are the prime beneficiaries of the system of multiple jurisdictions and ease of movement”). 
 193. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.  
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property assessments.
194
 A more sinister explanation of class bias might 
also be at work. If these motives truly explain city action, however, then 
cities are gambling on “better” businesses being available and willing to 
move in. Cities also risk being seen as less “business-friendly.”  
Alternatively, but also consistent with Tiebout, other, unaffected 
businesses in the city might support public health regulation because they 
stand to benefit from a healthier work force in a variety of ways, such as 
fewer sick days, heightened worker productivity, and lower health 
insurance costs. Thus, businesses might choose a jurisdiction on the basis 
of public health regulations, among other factors. Just as in the residential 
context, however, public health regulations are likely to rank low on the 
list of factors affecting the location of a business.
195
 Moreover, the 
potential cost savings to an employer from public health regulations’ 
impact on its work force are long-term and indirect, and thus difficult to 
factor into an employer’s costs.  
If Tiebout-ian competition and the mobile capital narrative do not 
provide a compelling explanation for heightened public health regulation 
by cities, the record of aggressive local public health regulation begs an 
explanation. Richard Schragger has offered one in a different realm: that 
of local “economic redistribution” like living wage ordinances and 
employer healthcare mandates. Schragger argues that, at least for certain 
place-dependent industries, capital is “sticki[er]” than commonly 
imagined.
196
 Thus, Schragger concludes, cities have a freer hand to 
promote redistributive policies than the orthodox “mobile capital” 
narrative predicts.
197
  
Much of Schragger’s insight can be extended to the public health 
context, at least insofar as it explains why cities might be more resistant to 
mobile capital than previously thought. For instance, McDonald’s did not 
abandon New York City after it banned trans fats and required menu 
labeling, despite opposing both policies.
198
 Nor has McDonald’s 
 
 
 194. Cf. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). There is also the possibility that a city 
might exclude chain restaurants for aesthetic purposes. See, e.g., Stacey Stowe, Nantucket Votes to 
Ban Chain Stores from Downtown, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/12/ 
realestate/commercial/12island.html?pagewanted=all. 
 195. The empirical work on what motivates business relocation decisions has not explored this 
specific point, even if it has looked at the “regulatory environment” more generally. See Wuyang Hu et 
al., Understanding Firms’ Relocation and Expansion Decisions Using Self-Reported Factor 
Importance Rating, 38 REV. REGIONAL STUD. 67, 69 (2008). 
 196. Schragger, supra note 189, at 520–21. 
 197. Id. at 526. 
 198. See Erik Engquist, McDonald’s Readies for NYC Trans Fat Fight, CRAIN’S NEW YORK 
BUSINESS (Nov. 14, 2006, 2:08 PM), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20061114/FREE/ 
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threatened to depart the city en masse since the soda-size restrictions were 
announced.
199
 Unlike manufacturers of moveable, durable goods, 
McDonald’s must be physically proximate to potential customers. By 
leaving the New York City market, McDonald’s would lose access to 
millions of potential consumers.
200
 Thus, so long as its franchises can 
remain reasonably profitable, McDonald’s is likely to comply with 
regulations it finds burdensome or annoying rather than flee the city 
entirely.
201
 In this sense, the more populous cities (as well as those that are 
larger and more isolated geographically) are better positioned to resist 
capital flight. Their markets are simply too potentially profitable for 
certain businesses to ignore, even if they come with extra regulatory 
baggage. The “agglomeration” benefits that cities offer thus insulate them 
to some degree, particularly in the retail setting, from capital flight.
202
 But 
agglomeration still cannot explain why cities are more likely than states or 
the federal government to adopt such regulations, since the federal 
government and most states should be just as resistant to capital flight as 
large cities, if not more so. In sum, the Tiebout and mobile capital 
narratives are largely a wash; they neither explain convincingly why cities 
should not be adopting heightened public health regulations, nor do they 
convincingly explain why cities are adopting such regulations. 
III. INCOMPLETE, BUT PARTIALLY HELPFUL, EXPLANATIONS FOR 
LOCAL INNOVATION 
A number of scholars have theorized that cities are uniquely capable of 
providing a more responsive and representative form of government, 
which could theoretically lead to more stringent public health regulation 
than found at higher levels of government. In addition to the Tiebout-ian 
narrative, discussed above, a separate strain of thought stresses the 
 
 
61114007 (noting that McDonald’s was “preparing to go to war” over New York City’s proposed 
ban); David B. Caruso, Chains Refuse to Put Calories on Menus, USA TODAY (June 26, 2007, 6:07 
PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/health/2007-06-26-1714835372_x.htm (stating that 
McDonald’s planned “to defy” New York City’s calorie count rule).  
 199. Of course, the McDonald’s franchise business model complicates such decisions, since 
franchise owners have a vested interest in their specific locations. See ROBERT E. BOND, BOND’S 
FRANCHISE GUIDE 8–9 (23d ed. 2012) (describing franchise industry structure). 
 200. As of 2004, there were more than 250 McDonald’s outlets in New York City. Mark 
Jacobson, Supersize City, N.Y. MAG. (May 10, 2004), http://nymag.com/nymetro/food/features/ 
n_10341/. 
 201. Again, the franchise caveat. See supra note 199. 
 202. See Schragger, supra note 189, at 521 (agglomeration can make capital sticky); see also 
David Schleicher, The City As a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1507, 1515–29 
(discussing agglomerative benefits of cities).  
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“communitarian” advantages of local government. Unlike Tiebout and 
public choice, communitarianism is decidedly noneconomic in its 
approach. Instead of assuming rational, self-interested actors in public and 
private spheres, communitarianism draws on civic republican theory to 
posit that local democracy is peculiarly capable of transforming both the 
individuals who participate in it and what local government does. In other 
words, communitarians argue that public choice is less descriptively 
accurate at the local level than at higher levels of government. 
Communitarians theorize that the smaller scale of local government can 
smooth some of the coarser elements of national and state politics that 
thrive on public choice dynamics, like the naked pursuit of self-interest 
(by individuals and groups), the negative campaign attacks, and partisan 
warfare.
203
 Indeed, public health advocates, in particular, have invoked 
communitarian themes in explaining why cities may be better venues for 
regulatory policy innovation.
204
 
Reconciling the vast differences between communitarianism and public 
choice theory is beyond the scope of this Article. This Section wrestles 
only with those strands of communitarian theory that might help explain 
local public health innovation in public choice terms. To begin with, the 
Section focuses on that part of communitarianism that stresses the effect of 
local participation on government outputs or policies (the “utilitarian” 
strand of communitarianism),
205
 as opposed to the “dignitary” strand of 
communitarianism, which emphasizes the participation’s transformative 
effect on citizens.
206
 Unless the dignitary benefits of communitarianism 
cycle back into the governmental process and affect local outputs, they are 
irrelevant to this Article’s objective of assessing why different levels of 
government produce different policies.  
 
 
 203. See generally Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Romancing the Town: Why We (Still) Need a 
Democratic Defense of City Power, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2009 (2000) (reviewing GERALD E. FRUG, 
CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS (1999)). 
 204. See, e.g., Michael Siegel et al., Preemption in Tobacco Control: Review of an Emerging 
Public Health Problem, 278 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 858, 859 (1997) (“[L]ocal elected officials . . . 
represent their friends and neighbors and are highly accountable to their constituents, making them less 
inclined to serve tobacco industry interests.”). 
 205. See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial 
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1916 (2001) (dividing “[t]he leading scholarship on federalism” 
into two groups: those that describe “value of local participation” in “utilitarian” and “dignitary 
terms”). 
 206. E.g., JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 
(1861); ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 73 (Henry Reeve trans., A.S. Barnes & 
Co. 1856) (1835). 
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A. Utilitarian Communitarianism: Its Limits and Insights 
Communitarians argue that local government is more democratically 
responsive, in large part due to its smaller scale.
207
 This smaller scale 
enables participants in local government to engage in more deliberative 
democracy that promotes the “public good” rather than mere interest-
group politics.
208
 As an explanation for local public health innovation, the 
utilitarian communitarian account proceeds from a premise that is difficult 
to defend. Many communitarians assume that citizens should and will care 
more about local than higher levels of government because of its closeness 
to them.
209
 As measured by voting rates, however,
210
 citizens care least 
about local government, and care much more about national government, 
the level from which, per communitarian theory, they should feel most 
removed.
211
 David Schleicher’s explanation for this relative disinterest is 
the lack of true ideological competition in local elections, and his 
proposed solutions might boost voter interest in local government.
212
 
Nonetheless, in smaller cities and those cities with more evenly split party 
registration among voters—where one might expect more ideological 
competition—turnout in local elections still lags behind state and national 
elections.
213
  
Even if one is skeptical of communitarianism’s premises and its 
foundational claims of civic republicanism, the smaller scale of local 
government may nonetheless impact the public choice narrative. In 
particular, the lower constituents-to-official ratio and the physical 
 
 
 207. E.g., BRIAN E. ADAMS, CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN LOCAL ELECTIONS: BUYING THE 
GRASSROOTS 5 (2010). 
 208. E.g., id. (citing JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY 23–35 (1980)). 
 209. E.g., DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 206, at Book 2, 111 (citizens are likely to care more 
about local matters than “the destiny of the State”). 
 210. Of course, there are other forms of civic participation, like attending local government board 
meetings and contacting public officials, see J. ERIC OLIVER, DEMOCRACY IN SUBURBIA 42 (2001), 
but the data for these are difficult, if not impossible, to compare across layers of government vertically 
given the impracticability of a citizen in, say, California, attending a Congressional hearing in 
Washington, D.C.  
 211. Donald P. Green et al., Getting Out the Vote in Local Elections: Results from Six Door-to-
Door Canvassing Experiments, 65 J. POL. 1083, 1083 (2003) (“[T]he typical U.S. municipal election 
draws between one-fifth and one-half of the registered electorate.”). 
 212. David Schleicher, Why Is There No Partisan Competition in City Council Elections? The 
Role of Election Law, 23 J.L. & POL. 419, 465–73 (2007). 
 213. OLIVER, supra note 210, at 42–52 (showing that voting rates decline from least populous 
cities to more populous ones, although rates increase somewhat for the most populous cities in large 
metropolitan areas); J. ERIC OLIVER ET AL., LOCAL ELECTIONS AND THE POLITICS OF SMALL-SCALE 
DEMOCRACY 55, 64–67 (2012). As Oliver notes, turnout for local elections varies wildly depending on 
when elections are held. When they are held in conjunction with federal or state elections, voting rates 
are significantly higher than when local elections occur on their own. Id. at 64–65.  
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proximity of government decisionmakers to their constituents may lower 
the costs of both campaigning and lobbying, key tools by which interest 
groups pursue their goals. The synergy between these factors may help 
explain why proponents of public health regulation have comparatively 
more influence at the local level than at the state and federal levels.  
Although it varies widely among major cities, the constituents-to-
official ratio is generally lower at the local level than at the federal and 
state levels.
214
 The ratios vary from 50,000 to 250,000 per councilor at the 
city level,
215
 whereas for federal senators, the ratio reaches into the multi-
millions for large states (e.g., two senators for California’s thirty-eight 
million people), while dipping to 300,000 or so in the least populous 
states.
216
 The average city ratio is also lower than the average for the 
federal House of Representatives, which is 710,000 residents per 
member.
217
 The degree to which local constituents-to-official ratios depart 
from their state counterparts fluctuates widely. Among state lower houses, 
only California has a ratio much higher than that of large city councils: 
more than 400,000 constituents per representative.
218
 All other states’ 
ratios are lower than 220,000.
219
 Among state upper houses (usually 
“senates”), there are at least ten with ratios upwards of 200,000, including 
California with over 930,000; Texas with 811,000; Florida with 470,000; 
and Ohio with 349,000.
220
 As compared to at least some large states’ 
senates, therefore, populous cities offer a lower constituents-to-official 
ratio. As the following table shows, the comparison within states like New 
York and California makes this disparity more striking.  
 
 
 214. Compare App. 3, with 2010 Constituents Per State Legislative District Table, NAT’L CONF. 
OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/2010-constituents-per-
state-legislative-district.aspx (last visited Feb. 17, 2014) [hereinafter “NCSL CHART”], based on 2010 
data). Of course, state levels vary widely themselves. See id.  
 215. See App. 3. 
 216. E.g., Wyoming, Vermont, North Dakota. 
 217. Members of Congress, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/members (last 
visited May. 25, 2014). 
 218. NCSL CHART, supra note 214. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
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TABLE 1 
City 
Constituents 
/U.S. Senator221 
Constituents/ 
state senator 
Constituents/ 
city councilor 
New York City 9,750,000 307,000 162,000 
Los Angeles 19,000,000 930,000 255,000 
San Francisco 19,000,000 930,000 73,000 
 
Insofar as fewer constituents results in fewer inquiries and contacts, 
and assuming that legislators at all levels of government have an equal 
amount of time, fewer constituents allow a local legislator to devote more 
attention to the concerns of a particular constituent. Of course, accounting 
for staff greatly complicates this inquiry. If legislators at higher levels of 
government have more, and abler, staff members than those at local levels, 
and assuming the staff members serve as perfect agents of the legislator, 
the effect of the constituents-to-official ratio in this regard could be 
neutralized. To the extent that staffs are not perfect agents and that actual 
face-to-face time with legislators matters, the lower constituents-to-official 
ratio is more important. Moreover, the lower constituents-to-official ratio, 
in addition to greater geographical proximity, makes it more likely that 
legislators will have informal interactions with constituents, which might 
make their legislation more responsive to a broader base of constituents. 
To be sure, the mix of at-large and district representatives, which varies 
among cities, may affect the degree to which councilors interact with their 
constituents and the costs of campaigning. Presumably, races for at-large 
city council seats cost more than those for district seats.
222
 I do not focus 
on these differences here but I recognize that they may affect local 
political dynamics. 
Unfortunately, good comparative data regarding the costs of 
campaigning and lobbying at the local level are hard to find.
223
 Even 
though local campaigns are sometimes more expensive on a per-vote basis 
 
 
 221. Because senators represent the entire state and run for office statewide, one might use the 
entire state population (double this number) as a basis for comparison instead. 
 222. See ADAMS, supra note 207, at 87 (noting that in two cities that had both, at-large elections 
were more expensive than district elections). 
 223. See id. at 1 (noting that “knowledge of local campaign finance pales in comparison to that on 
the federal and state levels, largely a result of a paucity of data”). Adams attempts to fill this void by 
studying election data in eleven cities from 1993 to 2005. See id. ch. 2. 
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than elections for higher-level offices,
224
 the absolute costs of local 
campaigns appear to be lower than those at higher levels of government. 
City council races are substantially cheaper than those for Congress
225
 and 
appear to be cheaper—at least usually—than those for state legislature.226 
Hence, it takes decidedly less money for candidates to reach the 
electability threshold at the local level as compared to the federal level, 
and usually considerably less money than at the state level. Lower 
constituents-to-official ratios likely explain these lower costs in part, as 
lower ratios make lower-cost methods of campaigning (i.e., knocking on 
doors rather than television ads) more effective.
227
 The perceived lower 
stakes of local elections may also play a role in keeping costs lower. 
Finally, local campaign finance regulations, like caps on donations and 
public financing, may play a role in reducing the costs of local 
 
 
 224. Id. at 54 (“[C]ity elections are even more expensive than many state and federal elections, 
largely due to a lack of interest among voters, minimal media coverage, and off-cycle elections that 
lead to low turnout.”).  
 225. Adams’s comprehensive study of local campaign finance, id., does not compare local to state 
or federal races systematically. Rather, it compares campaign costs across cities. I use one of Adams’s 
measurements—the median amount of campaign money (in 2006 dollars) raised by victorious 
candidates who were in at least one competitive race—as a basis for comparison with federal and state 
data. See id. at 53 tbl. 2. Specifically, Adams provides this number for four cities considered in this 
study (I round numbers to the closest thousand): New York ($183,000), Los Angeles ($728,000), 
Chicago ($229,656), and San Francisco ($243,579). Id. Since Adams is using data from 1993–2005 
(except for San Francisco, for which he uses 2000–06), but stated in 2006 dollars, I will compare to 
data from the approximate middle of that time frame—2000—and not adjust for inflation to 2006 
dollars. On the other hand, because it is more easily available, I will use the amount spent in 2000, and 
because competitive elections are vastly more expensive than noncompetitive, I will include only those 
elections where the winner’s opponent spent more than $100,000. I also include only House of 
Representatives elections, which are usually much cheaper than competitive Senate elections. In these 
ways, the data understate the higher expense of federal races. For California, the 2000 average is 
$1,377,000. See Congressional Races in California, 2000 cycle, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.open 
secrets.org/races/election.php?state=CA&cycle=2000 (last visited Jan. 25, 2014). For New York, 
$1,009,000. Congressional Races in New York, 2000 cycle, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.open 
secrets.org/races/election.php?state=NY&cycle=2000 (last visited Jan. 25, 2014). For Illinois, 
$1,463,000. Congressional Races in Illinois, 2000 cycle, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.open 
secrets.org/races/election.php?state=IL&cycle=2000 (last visited Jan. 25, 2014).  
 226. For state legislative races, I also use data from 2000. In California, the median state house 
winner raised $471,000, but this includes all races, even noncompetitive ones. Nat’l Inst. on Money in 
State Pol., California 2000 Elections, FOLLOW THE MONEY, http://followthemoney.org/database/ 
graphs/meta/meta.phtml (select “California;” then select “2000;” and select “House”) (last visited Jan. 
25, 2014). Among winners, nineteen raised more than $1 million, five raised more than $2 million, and 
one raised more than $6 million. Id. The numbers are higher, as one would expect, for the state senate. 
Id. (median senate winner raised $762,000). In New York, the median Assembly winner won in 2000 
with a mere $61,000, although fourteen (of 150) successful candidates raised more than $200,000. Id. 
For the state senate, the numbers are predictably higher, with a median of $141,000, and eight (of 
sixty-two) raising more than $500,000. Id. In Illinois, the numbers for 2000 are a median of $131,000 
for the House (with eleven of 118 over $500,000), and $299,000 for the senate (with six of twenty-two 
raising more than $500,000). Id. 
 227. Accord Hills, supra note 203, at 2027. 
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campaigns.
228
 Excluding the handful of public financing schemes, 
however, the relevant caps for campaign contributions to local candidates 
will usually be the same as the caps for contributions to state candidates.   
Of course, a lower financial electability threshold need not militate 
against well-funded interest groups. If there are no or weak limits on 
campaign contributions, as is the case in a number of big cities,
229
 a 
candidate can more easily get to the electability threshold with a handful 
of donations from interest groups like Big Tobacco and the Food Industry 
at the local level than she can at a higher level with a higher electability 
threshold. Moreover, limits on independent expenditures by third parties 
and “issue advertisements” are generally weak.230 On the other hand, the 
option of amassing many smaller contributions is more viable at the local 
level; at a higher level of government, it may be more difficult for 
candidates to run credible campaigns without attracting contributions from 
at least some well-funded donor groups.
231
 Further, in the handful of big 
cities with public financing, small-donor participation is magnified.
232
 
Thus, there is usually a more plausible path to electability for a candidate 
with less campaign cash at the local level than at higher levels of 
 
 
 228. See, e.g., ADAMS, supra note 207, at 167–91 (reviewing the impact of public financing 
schemes on local elections); see also Paul A. Diller, The Brief History of “Voter-Owned Elections” in 
Portland, Oregon: If Public Financing Can’t Make It There, Can It Make It Anywhere?, 49 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 637 (2013) (discussing Portland’s experiment with public financing for 
municipal candidates).  
 229. In some states, courts interpret the state constitution as prohibiting any limits on campaign 
contributions or spending, e.g., Vannatta v. Kiesling, 931 P.2d 770 (Or. 1997) (interpreting OR. 
CONST. art. I, § 8), thus going beyond current federal First Amendment law. E.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 
548 U.S. 230 (2006). For more on the state constitutional background, see Kristine Cordier Karnezis, 
State Regulation of the Giving or Making of Political Contributions or Expenditures by Private 
Individuals, 94 A.L.R.3d 944 (1979 & Supp. 2011). In addition to state constitutional restrictions, state 
statutes may establish a minimal regulatory framework for campaign contributions and spending at the 
local level, see CHIP NIELSEN ET AL., STATE CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS 6 (2007) (“State laws usually 
apply to campaigns for state office . . . as well as to campaigns for local office.”); id. App. A (offering 
state-by-state overview), and may also preempt the authority of cities to regulate further. E.g., WASH. 
REV. CODE § 42.17.128 (2012) (preempting Seattle and King County’s publicly financed campaign 
programs); see also Paul Ryan, Beyond BCRA: Cutting-Edge Campaign Finance Reform at the Local 
Government Level, 92 NAT’L CIV. REV. 3, 7 (2003). 
 230. See infra note 249. 
 231. For a description of who tends to donate to local campaigns, see ADAMS, supra note 207, at 
ch. 6.  
 232. New York City, for instance, matches with public funds donations of up to $175 for city 
council candidates by city residents at a six-to-one ratio. N.Y.C., N.Y., MUN. CODE §§ 3-701, 703 & 
705 (2013) (optional public financing). Other top twenty-five cities with public financing include 
Austin, Los Angeles, and San Francisco. See Jessica A. Levinson & Smith Long, Mapping Public 
Financing in American Elections, CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES 4–5 (2009).  
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government.
233
 Assuming that campaign contributions affect politicians’ 
stances,
234
 this dynamic may reduce the relative influence of some well-
funded interest groups at the local level, thereby enabling public health 
organizations to achieve comparatively greater influence.  
It bears noting that the constituents-to-official ratio for mayors is also 
relevant due to the role of the mayor in the local legislative (and 
administrative) processes. Obviously, because mayors are elected at-large, 
the ratio is much higher than for councilors elected by district. In New 
York City, for instance, the ratio is more than eight million. The 
constituents-to-official ratio for mayors, however, will necessarily be far 
lower than the ratio for President or governor of the state in which the city 
is located. With respect to campaign finance, unlike city council races, 
mayoral races are more commonly high-profile and expensive.
235
 As 
expensive as mayoral campaigns may be, however, they will always be 
cheaper than presidential races, and will usually lag gubernatorial races as 
well. Thus, even if mayors run more expensive campaigns than city 
councilors and represent far more people than councilors elected by 
district, the relevant comparison is to executive officials at higher levels of 
government.  
Also stemming from local government’s smaller scale are reduced 
lobbying costs for interest groups that are based within the city.
236
 There is 
some evidence that lobbying expenditures have a greater influence on 
public policy than campaign contributions.
237
 Clayton Gillette has shown 
why it is easier for interest groups to coalesce physically at the local level 
 
 
 233. Adams finds that “the proposed benefits of public funding [have] fail[ed] to materialize,” see 
ADAMS, supra note 207, at 189, but he is more hopeful about “full” public financing, which only 
Albuquerque and Santa Fe, New Mexico, currently have. Id. at 190; Levinson & Long, supra note 232, 
at 4–5; Tom Sharpe, Campaign Financing Overhauled, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, Oct. 15, 2009, at A-
8, available at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/CAMPAIGN+FINANCING+OVERHAULED.-a02097 
12548. Portland, Oregon, had public financing from 2006–10. See Diller, supra note 228. 
 234. See infra note 237. 
 235. See Schleicher, supra note 212, at 420; ADAMS, supra note 207, at 93 (concluding that big-
city mayoral elections are “very expensive,” with costs akin to races for Congress or governor). 
 236. Comprehensive data on the amount of money that interest groups spend lobbying local 
officials (as opposed to state and federal officials) are not readily available. 
 237. Whether campaign contributions buy legislative favors or merely reflect pre-existing 
ideological preferences of contributors is much-debated among political scientists. See Adam Bonica, 
Avenues of Influence: On the Political Expenditures of Corporations and Their Directors and 
Executives 4–6 (Dec. 3, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2313232) (recounting debate). Recent findings, however, show that “returns 
on lobbying [expenditures] are far in excess (and more easily observed) than that expected on spending 
on elections.” Id. at 13 (citing studies from 2006 and 2009). 
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due to higher transportation costs to reach the state capital than city hall.
238
 
This assumes, of course, that each interest group is composed of members 
equally distributed around the city or state. It may be that certain interest 
groups—like public health organizations—are clustered in discrete cities 
and, therefore, may have an advantage in these cities over other groups. 
Assuming, however, that interest groups draw from at least some 
constituents within the jurisdiction whose government they are lobbying, it 
may be cheaper for a group to attend a city council meeting than a state 
legislative—or congressional—hearing.239 Further, since city councils 
usually have fewer members, the costs of lobbying members one-by-one 
will be lower.
240
 In sum, while the utilitarian communitarian account may 
not convincingly explain heightened local regulation to a public choice 
audience, its focus on smaller-scale governance provides useful clues. 
Clearly, more comprehensive empirical data, like time-stable vertical 
comparisons of campaign and lobbying costs, would be helpful.  
B. Concentrated Political Preferences 
One seemingly obvious explanation for heightened local public health 
regulation is that the residents of most large cities are notoriously 
politically “liberal” or “progressive.” Cities, therefore, provide a 
concentrated political majority that is decidedly not available at the federal 
level, and that is rarely, if ever, available at the state level.
241
 In New York 
City, for instance, 69% of registered voters are Democrats, as compared to 
a mere 11% Republican, a 58% advantage.
242
 The closest state with such 
lopsided party registration is Rhode Island, in which Democrats enjoy a 
37% advantage.
243
 Presidential election results, which may be a more 
reliable indicator of voter ideology than party registration,
244
 show a 
similar disparity. In 2012, for instance, Barack Obama defeated Mitt 
Romney 81% to 18% in New York City, 85% to 14% in Philadelphia, and 
 
 
 238. CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LOCAL REDISTRIBUTION AND LOCAL DEMOCRACY: INTEREST 
GROUPS AND THE COURTS 121 (2011). 
 239. It is, of course, open to question how much physical presence matters to lobbying 
effectiveness. 
 240. GILLETTE, supra note 238, at 121. 
 241. See Jonathan Rodden, The Geographical Distribution of Political Preferences, 13 ANN. REV. 
POL. SCI. 321 (2010).  
 242. New York State Voter Enrollment by County, Party Affiliation and Status, BD. OF ELECTIONS 
(Apr. 1, 2012), http://www.elections.ny.gov/NYSBOE/enrollment/county/county_nov11.pdf (using 
“active” numbers only). 
 243. Jeffrey M. Jones, State of the States: Political Party Affiliation, GALLUP (Jan. 28, 2009), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/114016/state-states-political-party-affiliation.aspx. 
 244. See Schleicher, supra note 212, at 441 n.77. 
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83% to 13% in San Francisco.
245
 No state came close to such widespread 
support for either candidate,
246
 and nationally, Obama won the popular 
vote by a modest margin of 51% to 47%.
247
  
Assuming that politicians try to appeal to the median voter,
248
 these 
numbers show just how far to the left, at least on “national” issues, voters 
in many of the most populous cities lean.
249
 This concentrated political 
liberalism gives city officials more policy space on the left of the spectrum 
than that enjoyed by their counterparts at the state or federal levels. Since 
views on public health regulation may roughly correlate to overall political 
ideology, it is perhaps not surprising that big cities are comparatively more 
hospitable to such regulation. Compounding the partisan demographic 
concentration, big cities do not include within their geographic boundaries 
many of the agricultural interests—such as tobacco or corn farmers—that 
may be inclined to oppose some of the regulations discussed in Part I. In 
addition, only some cities have the concentrated business interests—e.g., 
Coca-Cola in Atlanta, the tobacco service industry in Charlotte, North 
Carolina—that are likely to directly oppose certain public health 
regulations. Of course, industry groups are free to influence the democratic 
process in all cities by donating to political campaigns and paying for 
independent expenditures.
250
 As evidenced by the defeat of a handful of 
local soda taxes in the 2012 election, industry interests are willing to fight 
hard even at the local level.
251
 Moreover, even if they are not directly 
represented, Big Tobacco and the Food Industry likely have surrogates 
 
 
 245. Elections 2012, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2012), http://elections.nytimes.com/2012/results/ 
president. Presidential election results within cities are not easy to find, as most states run their 
elections on a county level. The above-cited cities, however, either constitute their own counties or a 
collection of counties. 
 246. The greatest statewide spreads of victory for Obama were 67% to 31% in Vermont, 63% to 
36% in Rhode Island, and 63% to 36% in New York, whereas for Romney they were 73% to 25% in 
Utah, 69% to 28% in Wyoming, and 67% to 33% in Oklahoma. Id.  
 247. See 2012 Presidential General Election Results, DAVID LEIP’S ATLAS OF U.S. PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTIONS, http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2012). 
 248. See generally Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy, 65 
J. POL. ECON., Apr. 1957, at 135.  
 249. In 2012, for instance, the only three cities among the top fifty in population to prefer Romney 
to Obama were Phoenix (sixth in population); Ft. Worth, Tex. (sixteenth); and Oklahoma City (thirty-
first). See Josh Kron, Red State, Blue City: How the Urban-Rural Divide Is Splitting America, THE 
ATLANTIC (Nov. 30, 2012, 11:17 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/11/red-state-
blue-city-how-the-urban-rural-divide-is-splitting-america/265686/. 
 250. Whether and the extent to which corporations can donate directly to campaigns varies by 
state, but state limits on corporate spending on independent expenditures are rapidly being dismantled 
under the federal First Amendment after Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). See, e.g., Am. 
Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2492 (2012) (reversing Montana Supreme Court 
decision that had upheld state’s ban on corporate spending on independent expenditures). 
 251. See Bittman, supra note 94.  
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within populous cities to defend their interests, like convenience store 
owners and fast-food franchisees. Nonetheless, the Food and Tobacco 
Industries’ reduced physical presence in many cities may diminish their 
influence. 
There remain many reasons to be skeptical, however, of the value of 
political preference concentration as an explanation for local public health 
innovation. First, while concentrated political preferences and one-party 
dominance might explain residents’ willingness to re-elect (or at least not 
reject) local officials who support heightened public health regulations, 
they still do not explain why such policies emerge from the local 
legislative process. After all, constituents might prefer a particular policy 
when responding to a survey, but without an organized interest group’s 
support, that policy is unlikely to make it through the legislative process. 
Thus, while an ideological leaning in favor of public health policies might 
grease the wheels of the legislative process, the initial push behind a 
proposal will often emanate from an interest group, raising the question of 
why such interest groups seem capable of a stronger push at the local 
level.   
Second, views on some of the specific local public health policies do 
not neatly track the divides at the national level between “liberal” and 
“conservative,” or “Democrat” and “Republican.” For instance, New York 
City’s portion-cap rule for sugar-sweetened beverages has united Sarah 
Palin, Glenn Beck, and the NAACP in opposition.
252
 Similarly, the city’s 
proposal, rejected by the USDA, to prohibit using SNAP benefits to pay 
for sugar-sweetened soft drinks had supporters and opponents on both 
sides of the ideological and partisan spectra.
253
 The pursuit of these 
programs thus cannot be explained credibly by simply pointing to New 
York City voters’ preferences in national elections. A similar dynamic 
exists with respect to soda taxes, which are opposed by those who dislike 
 
 
 252. Sarah Palin USA, TWITTER (Mar. 11, 2013, 5:47 PM), https://twitter.com/SarahPalinUSA/ 
status/311277308273115139 (hailing the trial court order enjoining the rule); Sal Gentile & Allison 
Koch, NAACP President Comes Out Against Blocked NYC Soda Ban, NBCNEWS (Mar. 16, 2013, 
12:18 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/51207127/t/naacp-president-comes-out-against-blocked-nyc-
soda-ban/#. Ud3p5234Jvo; Worst Mayor Ever: Bloomberg’s Soda Ban Passes 9–0, GLENN BECK 
(Sept. 13, 2012, 4:34 PM), http://www.glennbeck.com/2012/09/13/worst-mayor-ever-bloomberg%E2 
%80%99s-soda-ban-passes-9-0/. 
 253. Monica Eng, Politicians, Health Advocates Seek Transparency, Restrictions in Food Stamp 
Program, CHI. TRIB. (June 20, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-06-20/news/ct-nw-food-
stamp-spending-20120620_1_food-stamp-junk-food-supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program (noting 
that “[s]upporters and opponents of” such changes to SNAP “are remarkably diverse groups, with 
conservative fiscal hawks and liberal public health advocates tending to favor the idea,” while “[o]n 
the other side are not only large food corporations and anti-regulation conservatives but groups 
working to feed the hungry”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss5/7
  
 
 
 
 
2014] WHY DO CITIES INNOVATE IN PUBLIC HEALTH? 1265 
 
 
 
 
higher taxes generally, as well as by advocates for the poor who consider 
such taxes regressive.
254
 Moreover, issue preferences at the national and 
local levels are hardly stable. City initiatives, whether pushed by 
evangelizing public officials or public health interest groups, can shape 
public preferences that were either nonexistent or loosely formed before 
cities put certain issues on the public agenda. 
Third, even if fluid, preference intensity for public health regulations 
among voters likely rank far lower than preferences for “bread-and-butter” 
issues like schools, public safety, affordable housing, and transportation.
255
 
If so, the concentrated political preferences and one-party dominance so 
often seen in big cities may help explain heightened public health 
regulation in a circuitous way. For Schleicher, concentrated political 
preferences—or, more precisely, concentrated political party 
registration—is reason to believe that cities will be “uncreative” in the 
policy realm, at least with respect to “local,” as opposed to “national,” 
issues.
256
 As Part I demonstrates, cities are anything but “uncreative” in 
the realm of public health. Moreover, the prolific local regulation of 
tobacco and obesity challenges any dichotomy between “local” and 
“national” issues. On the other hand, the lack of competition in big-city 
council elections may help explain why the low-intensity issue of public 
health shoots to the top of the agenda for some city officials.
257
 The 
relative political insulation enjoyed by city councils allows them to 
proceed with regulations that may, in fact, be somewhat unpopular among 
the general public. Schleicher, therefore, may be correct that the lack of 
competition in city council elections results in “unrepresentative” 
lawmaking, but the record of innovation demonstrates that this lawmaking 
is decidedly not “uncreative.”258  
IV. THE STRUCTURAL COMPONENT OF LOCAL PUBLIC-HEALTH 
INNOVATION 
A significant, but heretofore undervalued, reason why local 
governments are more amenable to local health policy innovation is their 
streamlined legislative structure. This Section explains how the 
 
 
 254. See Christopher Bonanos, Taxa-Cola, N.Y. MAG. (Apr. 9, 2010), http://nymag.com/news/ 
intelligencer/65373/. 
 255. See supra note 187. 
 256. Schleicher, supra note 212, at 424, 426.  
 257. See id. at 419–20. As Schleicher notes, even in big cities with formally nonpartisan election 
systems, there is still very little competition for council seats. Id. at 421. 
 258. Id. at 426. 
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streamlined nature of local lawmaking, combined with the lower campaign 
and lobbying costs discussed above, provides a more favorable venue for 
public health interest groups to push for heightened regulation. For any 
interest group to succeed in creating law, it must overcome the inertia that 
is endemic to the legislative process. With a more streamlined legislative 
process, cities are more structurally inviting for the proponents of 
regulatory change than the more sclerotic state and legislative processes. 
A. Cities’ Streamlined Legislative Structure 
Unlike the national and state governments, cities do not have bicameral 
legislatures. While most city charters allow for the mayor to veto bills, a 
supermajority of the city council can override a veto.
259
 Because city 
councils are unicameral, a supermajority is needed in only one legislative 
body—rather than two—to overcome executive resistance. For instance, 
when Mayor Gavin Newsom vetoed the San Francisco Board of 
Supervisors’ bill restricting fast-food toy giveaways linked to meals of low 
nutritional quality, the Board overrode his veto by an 8-to-3 vote.
260
 
Putting aside the potential veto threat, city councils generally do not 
require supermajorities to pass legislation. In Congress, by contrast, it is 
now almost standard that a bill must clear the sixty-vote filibuster 
threshold in the Senate to become law.
261
 In many states, state 
constitutional provisions require supermajorities to enact certain kinds of 
laws, particularly those related to raising taxes or revenue.
262
 City councils 
often also lack the extensive committee structures prevalent in state and 
national legislatures, which can easily bottle up a proposal’s chance of 
becoming law.
263
 The net result is that cities have fewer and less robust 
 
 
 259. E.g., Legislative Process, THE N.Y.C. COUNCIL, http://council.nyc.gov/html/about/ 
legislative.shtml (last visited Jan. 25, 2014) (requiring vote of two-thirds of council members to 
override mayoral veto); see also U.S. Mayors, CITYMAYORS, http://www.citymayors.com/ mayors/us-
mayors.html (last updated Feb. 13, 2014). In the council-manager or commission systems, which are 
less common among big cities than they are among smaller-sized municipalities, the mayor may lack 
veto power. See id.; Victor S. DeSantis & Tari Renner, City Government Structures: An Attempt at 
Clarification, 34 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV., Spring, 2002, at 95, 99. 
 260. See Rachel Gordon & Heather Knight, Supes Override Meal-Toy Veto, SFGATE (Nov. 24, 
2010, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/supes-override-meal-toy-veto-3244821.php. 
 261. See, e.g., Emmet J. Bondurant, The Senate Filibuster: The Politics of Obstruction, 48 HARV. 
J. ON LEGIS. 467, 477–79 (2011).  
 262. See Max Minzner, Entrenching Interests: State Supermajority Requirements to Raise Taxes, 
14 AKRON TAX J. 43, 55–57 (1999). 
 263. See McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory 
Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, 707 n.5 (1992) (describing “veto players” in federal legislative 
process); see also GILLETTE, supra note 238, at 124 (noting that state legislatures have more and 
stronger “institutional safeguards,” like committees, than local legislatures). 
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“vetogates”—that is, institutional obstacles to the passage of legislation. 
“Bicameral legislatures,” on the other hand, “privilege the status quo,” as 
Gillette notes, by making it harder to enact new legislation.
264
 
Many municipal legislatures are nonpartisan. Congress, on the other 
hand, uses an extremely partisan system of selecting chamber and 
committee leadership, and every state legislature save Nebraska relies on 
partisan affiliation as well.
265
 Even where cities use partisan elections, 
however, the overwhelming tilt toward one political party (Democratic) in 
the largest cities means that city councils are unlikely to be locked in a 
close partisan divide.
266
 The party structure in Congress and some state 
legislative houses often requires that a bill have majority support of the 
majority caucus to move forward.
267
 Thus, a bill that enjoys the support of 
a majority of members of Congress may easily die if it does not meet this 
threshold. The reduced role of partisanship at the local level thus lowers 
another barrier to legislative enactment.
268
 Of course, there remain 
significant barriers to passing legislation at the local level. Powerful city 
councilors can bottle up legislation singlehandedly.
269
 Intraparty “council 
wars” can be as debilitating as fierce partisan warfare.270 The point here is 
simply comparative: city councils have fewer institutional bottlenecks. 
Overcoming the various barriers to legislative enactment at any level of 
government requires that interest groups and policy evangelists expend 
time, effort, and money to place their issues prominently on the legislative 
agenda. Because the smaller scale of local government reduces both 
campaign and lobbying costs, cities are a more affordable venue for 
 
 
 264. GILLETTE, supra note 238, at 181; see also Saul Levmore, Bicameralism: When Are Two 
Decisions Better Than One?, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 145, 155 (1992) (describing “bicameralism 
. . . as a general status-quo-preserver”). 
 265. LYNN HELLEBUST & KRISTEN HELLEBUST, STATE LEGISLATIVE SOURCEBOOK 2012: A 
RESOURCE GUIDE TO LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION IN THE FIFTY STATES 329 (2012). Nebraska is also 
the only state with a unicameral legislature. Id. 
 266. See Schleicher, supra note 212, at 419–20. 
 267. See infra note 352 and accompanying text (discussing the House of Representatives’ “Hastert 
rule”). 
 268. For more on the importance of one-party dominance in the legislative process, see Daryl J. 
Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2325–29 
(2006).  
 269. For instance, for two and a half years, New York City Council Speaker Christine Quinn 
singlehandedly refused to allow a vote on a paid sick-leave bill that was certain to pass. See Michael 
Howard Saul, Quinn Signs On to Paid Sick Leave, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 28, 2013, 8:46 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324000704578389031867416730.html?mod=WSJ_N
Y_LEFTTopStories. 
 270. See, e.g., Dick Simpson & Tom Carsey, Council Coalitions and Mayoral Regimes in 
Chicago, 21 J. URB. AFF. 79, 88 (1999) (noting that “two large, diametrically opposed blocs” were “in 
perpetual conflict” during Chicago’s mid-1980s “Council Wars” under Mayor Harold Washington). 
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pushing regulatory change than states and the federal government. In 
combination with their affordability as a policymaking venue, therefore, 
cities’ streamlined legislative process makes them especially inviting 
jurisdictions for public health policy change.  
Of course, Big Tobacco, the Food Industry, and their local surrogates 
have just as much at stake in lobbying against public health proposals that 
may harm their business interests as proponents have in lobbying for such 
proposals. Because industry groups are often better-funded than the 
proponents of heightened regulation,
271
 they too may benefit from the 
lower costs of lobbying local officials. It is also cheaper for them to lobby 
public officials at the local level than at higher levels, and they have more 
money to do so than the public health interest groups. Moreover, if local 
campaign contributions are unlimited, then Big Tobacco and the Food 
Industry are theoretically capable of overwhelming public health 
organizations with outsized, asymmetrical contributions.
272
  
In addition, Big Tobacco and the Food Industry might, at least in 
theory, seek to capitalize on cities’ streamlined legislative structure to 
achieve affirmative legislation that loosens the regulatory environment. At 
the state and federal level, for instance, the Food Industry has sought 
legislation conferring immunity from obesity-related tort suits.
273
 In part 
because many state legislatures have a more streamlined legislative system 
than Congress, the Industry achieved success in twenty-five states,
274
 
while a federal “cheeseburger bill,” although passed by the House of 
Representatives, was stymied by a Senate vetogate.
275
 Thus, a more 
streamlined legislative process can sometimes benefit industry groups too.   
 
 
 271. “Mom-and-pop” stores selling cigarettes and soda may have little money to spare on 
lobbying or litigation, but are likely to be supported by industry allies in opposing certain public health 
regulations. E.g., 23–34 94th St. Grocery Corp. v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 685 F.3d 174, 174 (2d Cir. 
2012) (small grocery store joined by Big Tobacco in challenging New York City’s graphic warning 
sign requirements); Verified Article 78 & Declaratory Judgment Petition at 7–8, N.Y. Statewide Coal. 
of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 653584/2012 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 12, 2012) (noting that plaintiffs challenging New York City’s soda serving size 
rule include representatives of hundreds of “small businesses” as well as national trade organizations). 
 272. As noted above, local campaign contributions are generally governed by the same standards 
that exist for state candidates. In some states, like Oregon, unlimited contributions to political 
candidates are permitted. See Diller, supra note 228, at 638. 
 273. See, e.g., Pelman v. McDonald’s, 237 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 274. See supra note 92. 
 275. See Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act of 2005, H.R. 494, 109th Cong. 
(2005) (passed House by vote of 306–120); Commonsense Consumption Act of 2005, S. 908, 109th 
Cong. (2005) (never moved out of Senate Judiciary Committee). 
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The key point here, however, is comparative: proponents of public 
health regulation are likely to be less overwhelmed by opposition spending 
at the local level than at higher levels of government, particularly when 
they are pushing for affirmative enactment of a new regulatory scheme. 
Moreover, since public health organizations are generally seeking more 
changes to the regulatory status quo, given the nature of the problems they 
are trying to address, they benefit disproportionately from local 
government’s structure and lower costs. Big Tobacco and the Food 
Industry, by contrast, often prefer the status quo. When they seek to loosen 
the regulatory regime, they are unlikely to focus on the local level given 
cities’ limited control over “private law” subjects like torts,276 and cities’ 
general inability, due to preemption, to enact a regulatory floor that is 
lower than the state or national standard.
277
 
The lack of partisan competition for city council seats may also assist 
public health proponents insofar as it is difficult for opponents of their 
proposed legislation to seek out credible candidates in the next local 
election to run against supporters of heightened regulation.
278
 Thus, even 
though local elections are cheaper, they may also be stickier—less price-
sensitive—and therefore less likely to be disproportionately influenced by 
better-funded interest groups. In this regard, elections for local officials 
stand in contrast to local direct democracy, in which an interest group like 
the soda industry may achieve more success by spending millions of 
dollars to attack directly a regulation it opposes.
279
    
 
 
 276. See Paul A. Diller, The City and the Private Right of Action, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1109 (2012) 
(surveying the “private law exception” to municipal home-rule authority). 
 277. See Diller, supra note 5, at 1146 (noting that state courts frequently allow cities to pass 
ordinances “more stringent” than state law, but not less so, when assessing preemption claims).  
 278. If there is no partisan competition in the general election, one might expect primary elections 
to provide a better opportunity for ousting councilors. Malcolm E. Jewell & Lee Sigelman, Voting in 
Primaries: The Impact of Intra- and Inter-Party Competition, 39 W. POL. Q. 446, 452 (1986) 
(concluding that dominance in a jurisdiction by one party is likely to increase primary participation for 
that party). Schleicher is skeptical that intraparty primaries for city council seats can allow for serious 
ideological competition. Schleicher, supra note 212, at 461. 
 279. See supra note 157; see also Jamin B. Raskin, Direct Democracy, Corporate Power and 
Judicial Review of Popularly-Enacted Campaign Finance Reform, 1 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 
21, 23–28 (1997) (explaining how corporate contributions to initiative campaigns are particularly 
effective at defeating proposed measures). 
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B. Normative Implications 
James Madison famously opined that the federal government would 
check factionalism more effectively than state governments.
280
 Although 
Madison did not include local government in his analysis, his concern 
about state government applies perforce, and to a greater degree, to local 
governments that operate on a smaller scale. Consistent with Madison, 
therefore, the success of public health legislation at the local level may 
simply reflect “factional” dominance. Much recent scholarship, however, 
undermines “Madison’s equation of small jurisdictional size with 
tendencies for a factional dominance.”281 Focusing on states, Boushey 
shows that different governmental systems (“hosts”) are variously 
susceptible to the policy proposals of different interest groups.
282
 While a 
state’s population and wealth can be relevant, the state’s lawmaking 
structure plays a very important, if not paramount, role.
283
 Expanding the 
inquiry to the local level, Gillette argues that, in some ways, local 
governments may be less prone to capture than higher levels of 
government, at least by certain interest groups.
284
 
Madison’s faith in the federal government’s resistance to faction 
capture was based more on the wider geographic base from which the 
federal government would draw than on any structural differences between 
the federal and state governments. As noted above, the fact that big-city 
officials represent a very small area of urbanized territory likely means 
that the interests of certain agricultural and other businesses are not 
represented to the same degree as they would be at the national or (some) 
state levels. The normative implications of this reduced representation 
depends on whether these interest groups exert “too much” influence at 
other levels of government, in part due to their superior financial ability to 
influence policy through lobbying and campaign contributions. An 
obvious way that the federal system amplifies the power of agricultural 
 
 
 280. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (“The smaller the society, the fewer probably will 
be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more 
frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals 
composing a majority . . . the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression.”). 
 281. GILLETTE, supra note 238, at 25; Pranab Bardhan & Dilip Mookherjee, Capture and 
Governance at Local and National Levels, 90 AM. ECON. REV., May, 2000 at 135, 135 (rejecting 
Madisonian view that local governments are more prone to capture, and noting heterogeneity of factors 
that affect a level of government’s susceptibility to capture). 
 282. See generally BOUSHEY, supra note 161. 
 283. Id. at 19 (postulating that a state’s receptiveness to different types of policies will depend on 
differences across key state political actors and institutions). 
 284. GILLETTE, supra note 238, at 180–81. 
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interests is through the allocation of congressional seats, particularly in the 
Senate, which violates one-person, one-vote egregiously.
285
 City councils, 
by contrast, are compelled to comply with one-person, one-vote.
286
 
Although Gillette is not convinced that local governments are always 
more susceptible to factional capture, he worries that vested interest 
groups might sometimes manipulate city councils to pass “redistributive” 
ordinances like living wages for “malign” ends.287 For Gillette, these 
policies are “malign” because they cannot credibly be reconciled with all 
constituents’ expected interests at the time of enactment.288 However valid 
Gillette’s concerns regarding local government capture are in the context 
of “living wage” ordinances, they are largely inapposite to the public 
health context. The proponents of public health regulation do not seek to 
“redistribute” wealth for reasons that can credibly be called “malign.” To 
be sure, industry profits may be reduced as a result of heightened 
regulation. For low-income and certain minority populations, better public 
health may, in the long-term, result in increased wealth. But the reasons 
for this “transfer,” if it can be called that, are premised on the notion that a 
healthier life is a better life and should be enjoyed by all (or, at least 
more), rather than based on a desire to simply transfer a certain number of 
dollars from one group to another. Moreover, if effective, regulations that 
lower tobacco use and obesity will benefit federal and state taxpayers 
generally (and taxpayers in some cities to varying degrees), as well as 
private employers and private insurers.   
V. HORIZONTAL COMPARISON OF CITY INNOVATION 
This Part compares the recent records of public health innovation 
across the most populous cities. A cross-city comparison can help test the 
structural thesis of this Article, as well as reveal other factors that may 
play a role in local public health innovation. Table 2 lists which cities 
among the top twenty-five in population adopted each of nine prominent 
public health regulations discussed in Part I. Of the tabulated regulations, 
five target tobacco: bans on outdoor advertisements; comprehensive 
smokefree indoor air laws; limitations on which retailers may sell tobacco; 
 
 
 285. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3. The electoral college and the House of Representatives also 
violate one-person, one-vote, but to a much lesser degree See id. (guaranteeing each state at least one 
representative); id. art. II, § 1 (establishing the electoral college). 
 286. See Avery v. Midland County, 380 U.S. 474, 476 (1968). 
 287. Like Gillette, Schragger also explores heightened local regulation through the lens of 
“redistribution.” See Schragger, supra note 189, passim. 
 288. GILLETTE, supra note 238, at 79.  
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graphic warning sign requirements for retailers; and bans on flavored 
tobacco. Four regulations focus on obesity prevention: banning trans fats; 
menu labeling requirements; toy giveaway restrictions; and portion sizes 
for sugar-sweetened beverages. I compare these nine policies because they 
sought to change the regulatory status quo significantly, were likely to or 
in fact did arouse substantial industry opposition, and were adopted by at 
least one of the twenty-five most populous cities. These nine policies are 
by no means exhaustive of local innovation with respect to combating 
tobacco use and obesity. Moreover, crude cutoffs had to be made in 
amassing this data. For instance, I include only indoor smoking bans that 
applied to all bars and restaurants, which omits ordinances like San 
Francisco’s and San José’s that, while innovative for the early 1990s, did 
not go so far. Despite these limitations, the data in Table 2 provide at least 
a preliminary window through which to assess horizontally cities’ records 
of public health regulation. 
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Table 2 shows that New York City is the clear leader in innovation, 
adopting seven of the nine tabulated policies. The only other cities to have 
adopted at least three of the nine policies are Baltimore, Boston, 
Philadelphia, and San Francisco, the latter of which adopted four.
289
 By 
contrast, Jacksonville, Memphis, Phoenix, San José, and Seattle stand out 
among top twenty-five cities for having adopted none, although Seattle’s 
case is more complicated. Seattle is under the jurisdiction of the joint King 
County-Seattle Board of Health, which adopted three of the nine policies. 
Because Seattle jointly funds the Board and participates in its governance, 
it is inaccurate to include Seattle among the laggards.
290
 In fact, one might 
even classify Seattle as an innovation leader, but its joint governance of 
public health with the county complicates comparing it to other cities. 
A. Innovation Leaders: New York City, Baltimore, Boston, Philadelphia, 
and San Francisco 
New York City, the undisputed innovation leader, enjoys a host of 
advantages that may help explain its record. It is by far the most populous 
city in the United States, and the largest city by far in the nation’s largest 
metropolitan area.
291
 Unlike some other big cities, its population has 
continued to grow in the last three decades.
292
 It is the nation’s unofficial 
capital of finance, art, and culture, thereby guaranteeing a steady flow of 
highly educated and prosperous residents. Real estate values are 
stratospheric.
293
 As the most populous city, New York also has a 
 
 
 289. Because Chicago banned flavored tobacco for such a brief period of time, see supra note 77 
and accompanying text, I do not include it among the cities that have adopted three tabulated policies, 
even if it adopted two others. See Table 2, supra.  
 290. See KING CNTY., WASH., CODE ch. 2.35 (2013); SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE 
§ 3.30.010 (2013) (referring to 1981 agreement between Seattle and King County regarding joint 
health board composition and department funding). 
 291. See App. 3; see Population Estimates, Metropolitan & Micropolitan Statistical Areas, 
Cumulative Estimates of Population Change for Metropolitan Statistical Areas and Rankings: April 1, 
2010 to July 1, 2011, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/popest/data/metro/totals/2011/  
(last visited Jan. 25, 2014) (estimating the New York City metropolitan area population at nineteen 
million, with Los Angeles ranking second, at nearly thirteen million). 
 292. See Edward L. Glaeser, Urban Colossus: Why Is New York America’s Largest City?, 4 tbl. 1 
(Harv. Univ. A. Alfred Taubman Ctr. for State & Loc. Gov’t, Working Paper No. 05-05, Apr. 2005), 
available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/var/ezp_site/storage/fckeditor/file/pdfs/centers-programs/ 
centers/taubman/working_papers/Glaeser_05_Colossus.pdf. 
 293. See Julie Zeveloff, The Ten Most Expensive Cities in the United States, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 
12, 2013, 8:39 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/most-expensive-urban-areas-in-america-2013-
2?op=1 (noting that the average home prices in Manhattan and Brooklyn were $1.3 million and 
$959,000, respectively). 
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municipal government with a large and well-developed bureaucracy.
294
 
The city has a “strong mayor”295 elected to four-year terms, and a full-time 
city council of fifty-one partisan members elected by district (for a 2011 
constituents-to-official ratio of 162,000) every four years.
296
 The city has 
an extensive, but necessarily optional, public financing system for council 
and mayoral candidates.
297
 The city also pays a relatively large share of 
Medicaid expenses and subsidizes public hospitals, and thus has a fiscal 
incentive to improve public health.
298
 With respect to formal authority, 
New York City enjoys broad regulatory home-rule powers but is subject to 
state legislative preemption.
299
 The city’s population is fairly homogenous 
politically, leaning strongly toward the Democratic party.
300
 
It is notable that a relatively high percentage of New York City’s 
policies have been adopted by administrative regulation rather than by 
legislative ordinance. Indeed, four of the seven tabulated policies that New 
York adopted were promulgated as rules by the Board of Health rather 
than enacted as ordinances by the council. Clearly, administrative 
rulemaking in New York is an important source of public health policy 
innovation. The success of the legal challenge to the Board’s sugary 
beverage portion-cap rule now threatens the degree to which 
administrative rulemaking, rather than city council lawmaking, can be 
used to promote public health in New York City.
301
  
 
 
 294. While good numbers are difficult to obtain, it appears that New York City employed more 
than 300,000 people as of 2002. Bloomberg Budget Goes Easy on Headcount, N.Y. FISCAL WATCH 
(Feb. 20, 2002), http://www.nyfiscalwatch.com/html/fwm_2002-04.html. That number is higher than 
that of every state except California, see Government Employment & Payroll, 2011 State Government 
Excel Spreadsheet, U.S. CENSUS, http://www.census.gov/govs/apes/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2014), 
although the City’s total includes teachers and educational support staff, who make up the largest share 
of state and local employees, but are usually on the local payroll. See Elizabeth McNichol, Some Basic 
Facts on State and Local Government Workers, CTR. FOR BUDGET & POL. PRIORITIES (June 15, 2012), 
http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=3410.  
 295. In the “strong mayor” form of government, the mayor is an independently elected executive 
official who usually exercises veto power over acts of the council. See June Sager Speakman, Urban 
Politics, in 21ST CENTURY POLITICAL SCIENCE: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 703 (John T. Ishiyama & 
Marijke Breuning eds., 2011) 
 296. See N.Y.C., N.Y. CHARTER chs. 1, 2 [hereinafter NYC CHARTER]. While the public 
advocate, elected citywide, is technically a member of the council, she lacks a vote. Id. §§ 22a, 
24c(9)(e). Every twentieth year, two two-year terms replace the four-year term elections. Id. § 25.  
 297. See ADAMS, supra note 207, at 170–89 (reviewing New York City’s public financing 
program). 
 298. See supra notes 163 & 166. 
 299. Erin Adele Scharff, Note, Taxes as Regulatory Tools: An Argument for Expanding New York 
City’s Taxing Authority, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1556, 1573–74 (2011). 
 300. See supra note 242 and accompanying text; see also App. 3 (ranking New York the 21st most 
“liberal” city in the nation). 
 301. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
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Given its unparalleled size and its cultural and financial importance, 
New York City may be sui generis. The other cities that have adopted at 
least three of the highlighted public health policies—Baltimore, Boston, 
Philadelphia, and San Francisco—may yield some more clues to urban 
innovation. Philadelphia’s population is greater than 1.5 million, while 
Baltimore’s, Boston’s, and San Francisco’s are below one million.302 
Boston and San Francisco have experienced at least some population 
growth in recent decades.
303
 Baltimore and Philadelphia, by contrast, have 
just begun to stabilize their populations after losing hundreds of thousands 
of residents since the middle part of the twentieth century.
304
 All four cities 
have lost manufacturing jobs in recent decades, but Boston and San 
Francisco have done better at replacing them with high-tech jobs.
305
 
With respect to political demographics, all four cities overwhelmingly 
lean Democratic.
306
 Each city has well-established home-rule powers, 
although all are subject to preemption by the state, and both Boston and 
Philadelphia may be subject to some additional, ill-defined limits on 
municipal legal authority in the “private” sphere.307 With respect to their 
systems of government, all have strong mayors elected to four-year 
terms.
308
 Baltimore’s partisan city council comprises fourteen members 
elected by district, in addition to a council president elected at-large, to 
four-year terms, for a 41,000 constituents-to-official ratio;
309
 Boston’s 
non-partisan city council comprises thirteen members (nine from districts; 
four at-large) elected to two-year terms, for a 48,000 constituents-to-
 
 
 302. San Francisco’s population is 812,000; Boston’s is 625,000; and Baltimore’s is 619,000. See 
App. 3. 
 303. WILLIAM H. FREY, METRO. POLICY PROGRAM AT BROOKINGS, POPULATION GROWTH IN 
METRO AMERICA SINCE 1980: PUTTING THE VOLATILE 2000S IN PERSPECTIVE 17 App. A (2012), 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/3/20%20population%20frey/0320_
population_frey.pdf. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Gerald Perrins & Diane Nilsen, Industry Shifts Over the Decade Put Philadelphia on a New 
Road to Job Growth, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Apr. 2010, at 4, available at http://bls.gov/opub/mlr/2010/ 
04/art1full.pdf. 
 306. See supra note 245 and accompanying text; see also Election Day 2012, CITY OF BOS. (Nov. 
5, 2012), http://www.cityofboston.gov/news/default.aspx?id=5845 (noting that 211,316 (or 55%) of 
Boston’s 387,142 voters were registered Democrats, as compared to 25,903 (or 6.7%) Republicans). A 
2005 study of the most politically “liberal” cities ranks San Francisco at nine, Philadelphia at eighteen, 
and Boston at twenty-four. See App. 3. 
 307. See Diller, Private Right, supra note 276, at 1127, 1167, 1169–70. 
 308. Speakman, supra note 295, at 703 
 309. BALT., MD., CITY CHARTER art. III, § 2. 
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official ratio;
310
 Philadelphia’s partisan council comprises seventeen 
members (ten from districts; seven at-large) elected to four-year terms, for 
a 90,000 ratio;
311
 and San Francisco’s partisan board of supervisors 
comprises eleven members, all elected by district to four-year terms, for a 
74,000 ratio.
312
 Of the four cities, only San Francisco has a program of 
public financing for campaigns.
313
  
Looking at the manner of enactment, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and San 
Francisco passed all of their public health policies legislatively. Boston, by 
contrast, implemented its three policies—smokefree workplace, a trans fat 
ban, and a tobacco place-of-sale restriction—by administrative rule. 
Boston’s health agency—the Boston Public Health Commission—is 
technically a separate body corporate, unlike New York City’s Board of 
Health, which sits within the executive branch of city government.
314
 
Boston’s mayor and the city council appoint the BPHC’s members.315 
Clearly, the records of Boston and New York demonstrate that 
administrative rulemaking plays an important role in public health 
innovation at the local level. Of the thirty-six instances of top twenty-five 
cities adopting any of the nine tabulated policies, eight were by 
administrative rule.
316
 Among the subset of ten obesity policy adoptions, 
five were by legislative ordinance and five were by administrative rule. 
Why Boston and New York, in particular, have thus far relied more on 
administrative rulemaking to combat obesity than they have to regulate 
tobacco is hard to say. At least some of the explanation may be that 
because their health departments have long regulated the sanitation of 
restaurants, expanding this jurisdiction to include regulation of foods’ 
nutritional content is a step seemingly consistent with established 
authority.
317
  
 
 
 310. BOS., MASS., CITY CHARTER § 11 & n.2. The ratios are 2011 population estimates, see App. 
3, divided by the number of councilors. In council-manager cities, I include mayors among councilors 
in making this calculation.  
 311. PHILA., PA., HOME RULE CHARTER § 2-100. 
 312. CHARTER OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF S.F., CAL. § 2.100. 
 313. See supra note 232. 
 314. See Bos. Pub. Health Act of 1995, 1995 Mass. Acts ch. 147 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 111 app. §§ 2-3 (2013)) (establishing the BPHC as “a body politic and corporate”). 
 315. See id. § 2-3(b) (providing that six of the seven members of the BPHC are to be appointed by 
Boston’s mayor subject to city council confirmation). 
 316. See Table 2, supra. Including Seattle-King County would raise the total of administrative rule 
adoptions. 
 317. E.g., Sonia Y. Angell et al., Cholesterol Control Beyond the Clinic: New York City’s Trans 
Fat Restriction, 151 ANNALS INTERN. MED., July, 21, 2009, at 129, 130 (explaining how New York 
City built on its “food safety infrastructure” to enforce trans fat restrictions); see also Jennifer L. 
Pomeranz, The Unique Authority of State and Local Health Departments to Address Obesity, 101 AM. 
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More broadly, the emerging record of local administrative regulation 
may call for its own explanation separate from one that focuses on the 
lawmaking process. In a separate article, I endeavor to provide one, 
explaining how institutional design may enable local administrative 
agencies to engage in expert-based rulemaking that is less influenced by 
the political forces that affect rulemaking at the state and federal levels.
318
  
More on point to this Article’s thesis, political actors at any level always 
exert at least some influence on the administrative process, if for no other 
reason than that they remain capable of overruling an administrative rule 
by legislation.
319
 The notion that administrative agencies effectively do the 
bidding of their legislative masters is often referred to as “legislative 
dominance,” and is a key claim of much public choice scholarship on 
administrative law.
320
 While the existence of legislative dominance at any 
level of government is hotly disputed, if it does exist at the local level, 
then local administrative agencies might favor public health causes for at 
least the same scale- and political demographic-based reasons that local 
legislators do, as described in Part III. Similarly, to the extent that the 
decision-making of administrative agencies reflects the desires of the 
elected executives who often appoint the agencies’ leaders, big-city 
mayors, like legislators, may also be more inclined to support public 
health causes for scale- and demographic-based reasons. 
With respect to structure, on the other hand, the streamlined nature of 
municipal lawmaking might actually make it easier for Big Tobacco and 
the Food Industry to obtain a legislative override of administrative rules 
they oppose. At the federal level, the Food Industry has sometimes 
succeeded in prodding Congress to overrule USDA regulations that seek 
to promote nutrition.
321
 At the local level, such overrides should be easier 
to obtain, at least as a structural matter. That there have been no formal 
attempts to overrule public health administrative regulations in Boston and 
 
 
J. PUB. HEALTH 1192, 1194–95 (2011). But see N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of 
Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 2014 N.Y. Slip. Op. at 16–17, 2014 WL 
2883881 (N.Y. Ct. App. June 26, 2014) (distinguishing between permissible agency regulation of 
“toxic substances” and potentially impermissible regulations that interfere with “personal autonomy,” 
like the soda portion cap). 
 318. See Diller, supra note 126. 
 319. But see id. at 1880 (asserting that it is “questionable” whether the Boston City Council can 
overrule a regulation promulgated by the BPHC). In defending the portion-cap rule, New York City 
argued that the Board of Health exercised authority delegated directly by state law, a claim which the 
New York Court of Appeals rejected. N.Y. Statewide Coal., 2014 N.Y. Slip. Op. at 8, 2014 WL 
2883881. 
 320. See CROLEY, supra note 32, at 47–48.  
 321. See Nixon, supra note 154. 
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New York, therefore, may indicate that city councilors agree with the 
rules, or at least not enough disagree to overturn.
322
 In New York City, 
Mayor Bloomberg has strongly supported the Board’s rules; thus, the 
Council was aware that any attempt to overturn them was likely to incur a 
veto.
323
 In Boston, given that the Public Health Commission is a separate 
body corporate, it is not even clear that the city council has the power to 
overrule its regulations.
324
 In sum, in those cities with aggressive public 
health agencies, local lawmaking structure may explain less of the 
observed regulatory innovation to date than in other cities that have relied 
more on the legislative process to enact public health regulations. 
B. Innovation Laggards: Jacksonville, Memphis, Phoenix, and San José 
Now on to the innovation “laggards”: Jacksonville, Memphis, Phoenix, 
and San José. The reasons for their apparent inaction vary widely, and are 
to some degree tied up with decisions made at the state or county levels. In 
both Memphis and Jacksonville, the respective state legislatures 
preempted the ability of any city in the state to adopt comprehensive 
smokefree workplace laws before such laws diffused widely.
325
 Phoenix 
never adopted a smokefree workplace ordinance, but Arizona voters 
approved a statewide law in 2006, which is earlier than many other cities 
and states acted.
326
 San José lies within a state that acted relatively early 
on three tabulated policies—smokefree workplaces, trans fat bans, and 
menu labeling—thereby voiding any perceived need for local action. 
Moreover, in the early 1990s, San José adopted one of the strictest clean 
indoor air ordinances to date.
327
 The measure, however, stopped short of 
 
 
 322. Although a majority of the New York City Council expressed opposition to the portion-cap 
rule by joining an amicus brief in the litigation before the Court of Appeals, see Brief of Amici Curiae 
New York City Council Members, N.Y. Statewide Coal., No. APL-2013-00291, 2014 WL 2883881 
(N.Y. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2014) (brief opposing portion-cap rule submitted on behalf of thirty-three (of 
fifty-one) council members), there was no formal effort by the Council to overrule the regulation 
legislatively.  
 323. See, e.g., Diller, supra note 126, at 1897, 1900 (discussing Mayor Bloomberg’s involvement 
in the Board’s promulgation of the portion-cap rule). 
 324. See supra note 319. 
 325. Florida preempted local control of smoking in 1985, 1985 Fla. Laws 257 § 9 (codified as 
amended at FLA. STAT. § 386.209 (2012)); Tennessee in 1994. 1994 Tenn. Act ch. 872, §§ 9, 12 
(codified as amended at TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1551 (2012)). 
 326. Proposition 201 (Ariz. 2006) (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-601.01 (2012)) 
(proposing “Smoke-Free Arizona Act” to prohibit smoking in public places). 
 327. See Nick Anderson, Tough Smoking Ban Takes Effect Today But San Jose Won’t Fine 
Violators of Law Until April 1, SAN JOSE MERC.-NEWS, Dec. 30, 1993, at 1B (noting that San José’s 
1993 clean indoor air ordinance, which exempted bars, was then “believed to be the toughest of its 
kind for a major U.S. city”). 
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banning smoke completely in bars and restaurants, thereby rendering the 
city a somewhat arbitrary “laggard” for the purposes of tallying 
regulations. San José has also enacted a strict third-generation smokefree 
ordinance banning smoking in outdoor public places,
328
 which I exclude 
from Table 2’s tabulation.329  
With the caveats expressed above, what other characteristics might 
explain the relative inactivity of these four lagging cities? Their population 
sizes and trajectories reveal little. As of 2011, the four laggards rank sixth, 
tenth, eleventh, and twentieth, respectively.
330
 All but Memphis have seen 
at least steady, if not significant, population growth in recent decades.
331
 
With respect to political demography, Jacksonville and Phoenix, in 
particular, are significantly less “liberal” than some other large cities.332 
As a consolidated city-county, Jacksonville includes suburban and rural 
areas.
333
 (Two other “cities” in the top twenty-five of population—
Indianapolis and Nashville—are also joint city-county governments and 
significantly less “liberal” than other top twenty-five cities,334 yet each 
enacted one of the public health measures described above.
335
) All four 
cities have nominally non-partisan governments.
336
 Jacksonville has a 
strong mayor with nineteen council members (fourteen from districts; five 
at-large) elected to four-year terms, for a constituents-to-official ratio of 
46,000;
337
 Memphis has a strong mayor with thirteen council members 
(seven from districts; six from two “super districts”) elected to four-year 
terms, for a 50,000 ratio;
338
 Phoenix has a council-manager form of 
government with an nine-member council elected from districts (except 
for the mayor, elected at-large) for four-year terms, for a very high ratio of 
 
 
 328. See San José, Cal., Ordinance 29053 (Apr. 17, 2012) (amending SAN JOSÉ, CAL., MUN. CODE 
ch. 9.44) (prohibiting smoking in outdoor dining areas and unenclosed common areas of multi-family 
residential properties).  
 329. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (explaining reason for exclusion). 
 330. See App. 3. 
 331. FREY, supra note 303, App. D. 
 332. See App. 3 (ranking Jacksonville and Phoenix as more “conservative” (thirty-seventh and 
seventy-sixth, respectively) than “liberal” (198th and 172nd) among cities with populations greater 
than 100,000; ranking San José as seventy-fourth most “liberal”; and Memphis as thirty-ninth).  
 333. See JACKSONVILLE’S CONSOLIDATED GOV’T, http://www.jaxhistory.com/journal11. html. 
 334. App. 3 (ranking Indianapolis and Nashville as more “conservative” than “liberal,” with 
Indianapolis, 82nd and Nashville, 117th). 
 335. See Table 2, infra. 
 336. Partisan vs. Nonpartisan Elections, NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, http://www.nlc.org/build-
skills-and-networks/resources/cities-101/city-officials/partisan-vs-nonpartisan-elections (last visited Jan. 
3, 2013). 
 337. CHARTER OF THE CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, FLA. § 5.01; Speakman, supra note 295, at 703. 
 338. Memphis, Tenn., Ordinance 1852 (1966) (amending city charter); Speakman, supra note 295, 
at 703. 
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163,000;
339
 and San José also has a council-manager form of government, 
with an eleven-member council elected from districts (except for the 
mayor, elected at-large) for four years, for a ratio of 88,000.
340
 
The laggards, therefore, as compared to the leaders in public health 
innovation, have less “liberal” populations and are more nonpartisan in 
government structure. Just how much these two factors matter to policy 
innovation is unclear, as some more “liberal” cities (e.g., Detroit and 
Washington, D.C.
341
) have done relatively little, and other cities with 
formally nonpartisan governments (e.g., Los Angeles) have promulgated 
some significant policies. Two laggards—Phoenix and San José—have a 
council-manager system. While some commentators expect such systems 
to produce more innovation due to managers’ supposed superior 
expertise,
342
 it may be that, to the contrary, council-manager cities 
innovate less because managers are more risk-averse in policy selection.
343
 
Without a political base, an unelected manager may be reluctant to take 
risks that threaten to anger powerful interest groups. The risk aversion of 
the city manager may filter down to administrative rulemaking since 
managers usually appoint the heads of executive departments in council-
manager cities.
344
 Also, with respect to administrative departments, not 
every city has a bureaucratic organ akin to the public health agencies of 
New York and Boston.
345
 In some areas, counties play a greater, and 
sometimes nearly exclusive, role in regulating the public health. The form, 
design, and funding of the relevant local public health agency, therefore, 
may significantly influence a particular jurisdiction’s propensity for 
promoting public health.
346
 
 
 
 339. PHX., ARIZ., CITY CHARTER ch. III, § 1. 
 340. See Government, SAN JOSÉ, CAL., http://www.sanjoseca.gov/index.aspx?NID=105. 
 341. Detroit has been ranked the most liberal city in the nation, and Washington, D.C., the fourth 
most liberal. App. 3. 
 342. See Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden, The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion, 52 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 840, 848 (2008). 
 343. E.g., Speakman, supra note 295, at 703 (noting that city manager is “not accountable to the 
public” and “politically neutral”); MORE THAN MAYOR OR MANAGER: CAMPAIGNS TO CHANGE FORM 
OF GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA’S LARGEST CITIES 13–14 (James H. Svara & Douglas J. Watson eds., 
2010). 
 344. E.g., Organization Chart, CITY OF PHX., http://phoenix.gov/webcms/groups/internet/ 
@inter/@dept/@mgr/documents/web_content/016897.pdf.  
 345. Phoenix, for example, apparently has no such department, see id., while the county in which 
it sits, Maricopa, has a vast Department of Public Health. See About the Department, MARICOPA 
CNTY. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, http://www.maricopa.gov/publichealth/about/default.aspx (last visited 
Jan. 25, 2013). 
 346. See Pomeranz, supra note 317, at 1193 (discussing the extent to which local health 
departments have regulatory authority and whether they use it); see also Zhuo (Adam) Chen et al., 
Obesity Prevention: The Impact of Local Health Departments, 10 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 603, 605–06 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss5/7
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A city’s underlying legal authority is another relevant characteristic of 
institutional design. As “creatures of the state,” local governments have 
long had their powers delegated—and limited—by state law. While 
expansive home-rule powers are now the norm for most populous cities, in 
some states home rule remains nonexistent or is still developing. For 
instance, while Memphis is technically a “home rule” city, it operates 
within a state that has a tradition of weak municipal authority.
347
 By 
contrast, Phoenix, San José, and Jacksonville enjoy broad home rule 
powers that would pretty clearly encompass the authority to pass public 
health ordinances absent statewide preemption.
348
 
CONCLUSION 
If this paper is correct that partisan concentration, smaller scale, and a 
more streamlined legislative process are key reasons for heightened public 
health regulation at the local level, the implications for legal doctrine and 
normative debates regarding vertical division of power are significant. To 
the extent partisan concentration plays a role in promoting public health 
innovation, it is difficult to replicate this characteristic at higher levels of 
government. Similarly, many elements of the smaller scale of local 
government are difficult to replicate at higher levels. On the other hand, 
the lower cost of campaigns could be replicated to some extent with more 
stringent campaign finance reform, assuming judicial acquiescence.
349
 
Moreover, constituents-to-official ratios at higher levels of government 
could be reduced by adding more representatives to state legislatures and 
Congress.
350
 Excluding potential changes to other levels of government, 
proponents of public health regulation should otherwise advocate for 
heightened local authority, whether on the basis of home rule, preemption, 
 
 
(2012) (reviewing research on public health agency efforts to combat obesity). For more on public 
health agencies, see Diller, supra note 126. 
 347. See Lon S. Felker et al., Tennessee, in HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A FIFTY STATE HANDBOOK 
391, 397 (Dale Krane et al. eds., 2001). 
 348. See, e.g., Jacksonville City Council, CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, FLA., http://www.coj.net/city-
council.aspx (noting that the Jacksonville city council “ha[s] almost unlimited power to enact 
legislation in order to provide for the needs of our community”). 
 349. Obviously, in recent years a slim majority of the Supreme Court has been extremely skeptical 
of government campaign finance regulation, often viewing it as an infringement on First Amendment 
“speech” rights. See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 
(2011); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 350. See, e.g., Gail L. Johnson, Letter to the Editor, Sunday Dialogue: Is a Bigger House Better?, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2013), http://http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/13/opinion/sunday/sunday-
dialogue-is-a-bigger-house-better.html (proposing to limit congressional districts to 100,000 people 
and to increase size of House of Representatives to 3,100 members). 
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or other doctrines. Proponents might even prefer a version of home rule—
often referred to as “imperio”—that shields local governments from 
preemption by the state.
351
 Contrarily, opponents of local public health 
innovation should prefer a system of vertical division of power that 
squelches local authority, or at least allows it to be easily overruled from 
above, whether legislatively or judicially. 
With respect to structure, if a more streamlined legislative system 
allows advocates of changing the regulatory status quo a greater chance of 
success, proponents of such change should prefer similar streamlining at 
higher levels of government. While federal constitutional change like a 
unicameral Congress is fanciful, more modest changes are worth 
considering, like eliminating the de facto filibuster requirement in the 
Senate, or ending the House’s custom of requiring a majority of the 
majority party to support a bill.
352
 On the other hand, interest groups 
opposed to changing the regulatory status quo should generally prefer the 
sclerotic federal system. At the state level, constitutional change is more 
easily accomplished, and might include the elimination of supermajority 
requirements for passing certain kinds of legislation.  
As the cheeseburger bill example demonstrates, sometimes an industry 
group uses a streamlined legislative process to pursue its goals. The 
cheeseburger bills were aided, however, by the larger scale of state (as 
opposed to local) politics and the potentially heightened influence of the 
Food Industry at such levels. From the standpoint of institutional design, 
local governments are likely to be more nimble at reacting to social and 
economic challenges that require changes to the status quo than 
legislatures at higher levels of government, even if their streamlined nature 
means that certain interest groups will be on the losing end. In doing so, 
however, local governments are less likely to be catering to the interests of 
well-funded groups. While this Article has used the public health sphere as 
a prism through which to reveal this dynamic, its account of local 
lawmaking and regulation enactment may also apply—to varying 
degrees—to other issues that cities have addressed ahead of state and 
national actors, like housing and employment discrimination, mandating 
paid sick leave, banning plastic bags, and immigration.  
Many commentators have lamented the “broken” state of the federal 
political system, with near-routine use of the filibuster in the Senate and 
 
 
 351. Cf. City of Cleveland v. State, 989 N.E.2d 1072 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013) (invalidating state 
attempt to preempt local trans fat ban). 
 352. See Sotirios A. Barber, Toward a More Responsible Congress? Congress and Responsible 
Government, 89 B.U. L. REV. 689, 710 (2009). 
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other indicia of partisan gridlock. Local governments provide a counter-
example to this tale of dysfunction, at least in the regulatory realm, as 
vividly demonstrated by records on public health. Whether local 
government’s methods can be effectively replicated at higher levels of 
government is uncertain. In the meantime, however, big cities provide an 
especially inviting venue for proponents of public health regulation 
opposed by well-funded interest groups.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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